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Abstract
This paper proposes a model of competitive bundling with an arbitrary num-
ber of rms. In the regime of pure bundling, we nd that relative to separate
sales pure bundling tends to raise market prices, benet rms, and harm con-
sumers when the number of rms is above a threshold. This is in contrast to
the ndings in the duopoly case on which the existing literature often focuses.
Our analysis also sheds new light on how consumer valuation dispersion a¤ects
price competition more generally. In the regime of mixed bundling, having more
than two rms raises new challenges in solving the model. We derive the equi-
librium pricing conditions and show that when the number of rms is large, the
equilibrium prices have simple approximations and mixed bundling is generally
pro-competitive relative to separate sales. Firms incentives to bundle are also
investigated.
Keywords: bundling, multiproduct pricing, product compatibility, oligopoly
JEL classication: D43, L13, L15
1 Introduction
Bundling is commonplace in many markets. Sometimes rms only sell packages and
no individual products are available for purchase. For example, in the market for CDs,
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newspapers, or cable TV (e.g., in the US), rms do not usually sell songs, articles, or
TV channels separately. This is called pure bundling. Other examples include banking
accounts, party services, and repair services tied with the product. On the other hand
rms sometimes sell both a package and individual products, but the package is o¤ered
at a discounted price relative to the sum of its component prices. Relevant examples
include software suites, TV-internet-phone bundles, season tickets, package tours, and
value meals. This is called mixed bundling. In many cases, bundling occurs in markets
where rms compete with each other.
One obvious reason for bundling is economies of scale in production, selling or
buying, or complementarity in consumption. For example, traditionally it was too
costly to sell newspaper articles separately. There are also other important reasons
for bundling. Bundling can be a protable price discrimination device to extract more
consumer surplus (Stigler, 1968, and Adams and Yellen, 1976).1 Bundling can also be
used as a leverage device by a multiproduct rm to deter the entry of potential single-
product competitors or to induce the exit of existing competitors (Whinston, 1990, and
Nalebu¤, 2004).2
The main anti-trust concern about bundling is that it may restrict market compe-
tition. One possible reason, as suggested by the leverage theory, is that bundling can
lead to foreclosure and so a more concentrated market. Another possible reason is that
even for a given market structure, bundling may relax competition and inate market
prices because it changes the space of pricing strategies. This is the main research ques-
tion in the literature on competitive bundling (see, e.g., Matutes and Regibeau, 1988,
and Nalebu¤, 2000, for pure bundling, and Matutes and Regibeau, 1992, Anderson and
Leruth, 1993, and Armstrong and Vickers, 2010, for mixed bundling). However the
existing research suggests that bundle-against-bundle competition tends to be ercer
than competition with separate sales (or component pricing), and so the second possi-
bility of inating market prices is usually not a concern.3 Nevertheless this assessment
of bundling is based on duopoly models.4 In this paper we will argue that considering
1There has been a substantial body of literature which studies bundling as a price discrimination
device. Most papers consider a monopoly market structure. For example, Stigler (1968), Schmalensee
(1984) and Fang and Norman (2006) study the protability of pure bundling relative to separate sales,
and Adams and Yellen (1976), Long (1984), McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989), and Chen and
Riordan (2013) study the protability of mixed bundling. In general bundling can be regarded as a
nonlinear pricing scheme (see, e.g., Armstrong, 2015, for a recent survey on this topic).
2See also Choi and Stefanadis (2001), and Carlton and Waldman (2002).
3When a multiproduct rm competes with a single-product rival, if consumers have heterogenous
valuations for the additional product, bundling can create vertical product di¤erentiation (i.e., the
bundle vs a single product) and relax price competition. See Carbajo, de Meza and Seidmann, 1990,
and Chen, 1997, for two such examples.
4One exception is Economides (1989). He studies competitive pure bundling when there is an
arbitrary number of rms and each sells two products, but comes to the same conclusion. We will
discuss this paper in detail in section 4.6.
2
more rms can qualitatively change our view of the impact of bundling, especially in
the pure bundling case.
There are many markets where more than two rms compete with each other and
adopt bundling strategies.5 The reason why the existing literature on competitive
bundling mainly focuses on the duopoly case is partly because it has not developed
a tractable enough model which can be used to study both pure and mixed bundling
with an arbitrary number of rms. This has limited our understanding of how the
degree of market concentration might a¤ect rmsincentives to bundle and the impact
of bundling. This paper aims to ll this gap in the literature.
The existing works on competitive bundling use spatial models to capture product
di¤erentiation,6 and they often use a two-dimensional Hotelling model where consumers
are distributed on a square and two multiproduct rms are located at two opposite
corners. With more than two rms, however, it becomes less convenient to model
product di¤erentiation in a spatial framework. For example, if there are four rms
and each sells three products, it is not obvious what spatial models will be easy to
use. In this paper, we will instead adopt a multiproduct version of the random utility
framework developed in Perlo¤ and Salop (1985). Specically, a consumers valuation
for a product is a random draw from some distribution, and its realization is independent
across rms and consumers. This reects, for example, the idea that rms sell products
with di¤erent styles and consumers have idiosyncratic tastes. This framework is exible
enough to accommodate any number of rms and products, and in the case with two
rms and two products it can be converted into a two-dimensional Hotelling model
(such that we can compare our results with the existing ndings from the duopoly
model).
Our study of how bundling a¤ects price competition and market performance has
broader implications. For example, pure bundling can be regarded as an outcome of
product incompatibility. Consider a system (e.g., a computer, a smartphone, a stereo
system) that consists of several components (e.g., hardware and software, receiver and
speaker). If rms make their components incompatible with each other (e.g., by not
adopting a common standard) or make it very costly to disassemble the system, then
consumers have to buy the whole system from a single rm and cannot mix and match
to assemble a new system by themselves.7 Bundling can also arise due to shopping
costs. If consumers need to incur an extra cost to source from more than one store,
5For example, the companies that o¤er the TV-internet-phone service in New York City include at
least Verizon, AT&T, Time Warner, and RCN.
6One exception is Anderson and Leruth (1993). They use a logit model to study competitive mixed
bundling in the duopoly case. Introducing product di¤erentiation is necessary for studying competitive
bundling when rms have similar cost conditions. If there is no product di¤erentiation, prices settle
at marginal costs, and so there is no meaningful scope for bundling.
7This is the interpretation adopted in the early works on competitive pure bundling such as Matutes
and Regibeau (1988) and Economides (1989).
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they have less incentive to multi-stop shop and are more likely to buy all the products
they want from a single store. This is like buying the whole package from a single
rm to enjoy a mixed bundling discount. If the extra shopping cost is su¢ ciently high,
consumers are forced to behave as if they were in the pure bundling situation.
Our study is also relevant to the recent trend of unbundling in many markets (es-
pecially in online markets). For example, in the music industry nowadays consumers
can download single songs from iTunes or Amazon. A similar idea is emerging in the
publishing industry. For instance, Blendle, an online news platform, o¤ers users in
Netherlands and Germany access to newspaper and magazine articles on a pay-per-
article basis. (A new startup CoinTent is trying to start a similar business in the US
market.) In the higher education market, the rapid development of online course plat-
forms such as Coursea is creating the possibility of unbundled higher education. Even
for non-digital products, unbundling is taking place in some markets where it used to
be di¢ cult. For example, by using online platforms like Caviar and Served by Stadium,
consumers can mix and match their desired dishes from di¤erent restaurants and have
them delivered in one order. Unbundling benets consumers in terms of the improved
choice exibility, but to evaluate its impact on consumer welfare we also need to un-
derstand how unbundling might change market prices. This issue is also related to the
recent debate about whether US cable companies should be required to unbundle their
TV packages.
In the section on pure bundling, the main message is that the number of rms can
qualitatively matter for the impact of bundling (or unbundling) on prices, prots, and
consumer welfare. In the duopoly case we conrm the existing ndings (but in a more
general setup): compared to separate sales, pure bundling intensies price competition
and lowers market prices and prots. For consumers this positive price e¤ect often
outweighs the loss from the reduced choice exibility caused by bundling. Beyond
duopoly, however, we show that under fairly general conditions the opposite is true (i.e.,
pure bundling raises prices, benets rms, and harms consumers) when the number of
rms is above a threshold (which can be small). This suggests that even if bundling
does not inuence market structure, it can be anti-competitive.
To understand these two contrasting results, rst notice that pure bundling reduces
consumer valuation heterogeneity and makes the distribution of consumer valuations
less dispersed. Compared to the single-product valuation density function, the density
function of the per-product valuation for the bundle is more peaked but has thinner
tails. Intuitively, this is because nding a well-matched bundle is harder than nding
a well-matched component. On the other hand, a rms pricing decision hinges on
the number of its marginal consumers who are indi¤erent between its product and
the best product from its competitors. When there are many rms, a rms marginal
consumers should have a high valuation for its product because their valuation for the
best rival product is high. In other words, they tend to be positioned on the right tail
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of the valuation density. Since bundling yields a thinner tail than separate sales, it
leads to fewer marginal consumers and so a less elastic demand. This induces rms to
raise their prices.8 In contrast, when there are relatively few rms in the market, the
average position of marginal consumers is closer to the mean. Since bundling makes
the valuation density more peaked, it leads to more marginal consumers and so a more
elastic demand. This induces rms to reduce their prices.
The existing research on competitive pure bundling argues that bundle-against-
bundle competition is more intense than single-product competition because bundling
makes a price reduction doubly protable. (When a two-product rm reduces its price,
a consumer who switches to it buys both products.) However our analysis suggests that
this intuition is incomplete. Essentially it ignores the fact that bundling also changes
the number of marginal consumers who will switch due to a price reduction, and this
e¤ect tends to work against the double protability e¤ect when there are enough rms
in the market.
In the section on mixed bundling, we nd that considering more than two rms raises
new challenges in analysis due to the complication of the consumer choice problem.
Our main contribution is to propose a method to solve the pricing game with mixed
bundling, and to show that under mild conditions the equilibrium prices have simple
approximations when the number of rms is large. For example, when the production
cost is zero the bundle discount will be approximately equal to half of the single-product
price (i.e., 50% o¤ for the second product). In terms of the impacts of mixed bundling
on prots and consumer surplus, they tend to be ambiguous in the duopoly case and
depend on the distribution of consumer valuations. However with a large number of
rms mixed bundling benets consumers and harms rms under mild conditions.
We also study rmsincentives to bundle in both parts of the paper. When pure
bundling is the only alternative to separate sales (e.g., when bundling is a product
compatibility strategy), the number of rms matters for a rms incentive to bundle.
Bundling is the unique Nash equilibrium outcome in duopoly, but when the number of
rms is above some threshold, separate sales can be an equilibrium outcome as well.
In some examples separate sales is another equilibrium if and only if consumers pre-
fer separate sales to pure bundling. When rms can choose the more exible mixed
bundling strategy, starting from separate sales each rm has a strict incentive to intro-
duce mixed bundling, independent of the number of rms in the market. That is, when
mixed bundling is feasible and costless to implement, separate sales can never be an
equilibrium outcome.
Finally, our study of the benchmark case of separate sales also contributes to the
8More precisely, the average position of marginal consumers di¤ers between the two regimes, and
their relative distance also matters for the price comparison. That is why as we will see later there are
also cases (especially when the support of the valuation distribution is unbounded) where bundling
always lowers market prices.
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literature on oligopolistic competition. We show that a standard log-concavity condi-
tion (which ensures the existence of pure-strategy pricing equilibrium) guarantees that
market prices decline with the number of rms. This result is not new, but we o¤er
a simple proof. We also investigate how the dispersion of consumer valuations a¤ects
price competition. This provides the foundation for the price comparison result in the
pure bundling part, and it is also useful for studying the impact on price competition
of any economic activities (such as information disclosure, advertising, and product
design) which can change the dispersion of consumer valuations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model and Sec-
tion 3 analyzes the benchmark case of separate sales. Section 4 studies pure bundling,
and Section 5 deals with mixed bundling. (A discussion of the related literature will be
provided in each section.) We conclude in Section 6, and all omitted proofs and details
are presented in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Consider a market where each consumer needs m  2 products. (They can be m
independent products or m components of a system, depending on the interpretation
of bundling.) The measure of consumers is normalized to one. There are n  2
rms, each supplying all the m products. The unit production cost of any product is
normalized to zero (so we can regard the price below as the markup). Each product is
horizontally di¤erentiated across rms (e.g., each rm produces a di¤erent version of
the product).9 We adopt the random utility framework in Perlo¤ and Salop (1985) to
model product di¤erentiation. Let xji;k denote the match utility of rm js product i for
consumer k. We assume that xji;k is i.i.d. across consumers, which reects, for instance,
idiosyncratic consumer tastes. In the following we suppress the subscript k. We consider
a setting with symmetric rms and products: xji is distributed according to a common
cumulative distribution function (CDF) F with support [x; x] (where x =  1 and
x =1 are allowed), and for a given consumer it is realized independently across rms
and products. Suppose xji has a nite mean and variance and its density function f is
di¤erentiable and bounded. (In Section 4.5.1, we will consider a more general setting
where a rms m products can be asymmetric and have correlated match utilities.)10
9It is important to introduce product di¤erentiation at the product level. If di¤erentiation is only
at the rm level, consumers will one-stop shop even without bundling, which is not realistic in many
markets and also makes the study of competitive bundling less interesting.
10In the basic model, for simplicity we have assumed away possible di¤erentiation at the rm level.
This can be included, for example, by assuming that a consumers valuation for rm js product i is
uj + xji , where u
j is another random variable which is i.i.d. across rms and consumers but has the
same realization for all the m products in a rm. This is a special case of the general setting with
potentially correlated match utilities in section 4.5.1.
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We consider a discrete-choice framework where the incremental utility from having
more than one version of a product is zero and so a consumer only wants to buy one
version of each product.11 We also assume that a consumer has unit demand for the
desired version of each product. (Elastic demand will be discussed in Section 4.5.2.)
If a consumer consumes m products with match utilities (x1;    ; xm) (which can be
purchased from di¤erent rms if rms are not bundling) and makes a total payment T ,
she obtains surplus
Pm
i=1 xi   T .
If a rm sells its products separately, it chooses a price vector (pj1;    ; pjm), j =
1;    ; n. If a rm adopts the pure bundling strategy, it chooses a bundle price P j. In
the rst part of the paper, we assume that rms can only take one of the two selling
strategies. (This is naturally the case if bundling is a product compatibility strategy or
if mixed bundling is too complicated to use.) We will rst study the regime of separate
sales where all rms sell their products separately. We will then study the regime of
pure bundling where all rms bundle their products, and compare it with the separate
sales regime. Finally we will investigate rmsincentives to bundle by considering an
extended game where each rm can individually choose whether to bundle its products
or not. In the second part of the paper, we allow rms to use the more general mixed
bundling strategy and each rm needs to specify prices P js for each possible subset s of
its m products. (If m = 2, it can be described by a pair of stand-alone prices (j1; 
j
2)
together with a joint-purchase discount j.) In all the regimes the timing is that rms
choose their prices simultaneously, and then consumers make their purchase decisions
after observing all the prices and match utilities.
As often assumed in the literature on oligopolistic competition, the market is fully
covered (i.e., consumers buy all the m products). This will be the case if consumers do
not have outside options, or if on top of the above match utilities xji , consumers have a
su¢ ciently high basic valuation for each product (or if the lower bound of match utility
x is high enough). Alternatively we can consider a situation where the m products are
essential components of a system for which consumers have a high basic valuation. In
the regimes of separate sales and pure bundling, we will relax this assumption in Section
4.5.2 and argue that the basic insights remain qualitatively unchanged. However, in
the regime of mixed bundling this assumption is important for tractability.
11This assumption is made in all the papers on competitive (pure or mixed) bundling. But it is
not without loss of generality. For example, reading another article on the same subject in a di¤erent
newspaper, or reading another chapter on the same topic in a di¤erent textbook, sometimes improves
utility. There are works on consumer demand which extend the usual discrete choice model by allowing
consumers to consume multiple versions of a product (see, e.g., Gentzkow, 2007).
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3 Separate Sales: Revisiting Perlo¤-Salop Model
This section studies the benchmark regime of separate sales. Since rms compete on
each product separately, the market for each product is a Perlo¤-Salop model. Consider
the market for product i, and let p be the (symmetric) equilibrium price.12 Suppose
rm j deviates to price p0, while other rms stick to the equilibrium price p. Then the
demand for rm js product i is
q(p0) = Pr[xji   p0 > max
k 6=j
fxki   pg] =
Z x
x
[1  F (x  p+ p0)]dF (x)n 1 :
(In the following, whenever there is no confusion, we will suppress the integral limits
x and x.) Notice that F (x)n 1 is the CDF of the match utility of the best product i
among the n 1 competitors. So rm j is as if competing with one rm which has match
utility distribution F (x)n 1 and charges p. In equilibrium the demand is q(p) = 1=n
since rms are symmetric to each other.
Firm js prot from product i is p0q(p0), and in equilibrium it should be maximized
at p0 = p. This yields the rst-order condition for p to be the equilibrium price:
1
p
= n
Z
f(x)dF (x)n 1 : (1)
This condition is also su¢ cient for dening the equilibrium price if f is log-concave
(see Caplin and Nalebu¤, 1991).13 In the uniform distribution example with F (x) = x,
it is easy to see that p = 1=n, and in the extreme value distribution example with
F (x) = e e
 x
(which generates the logit model), one can check that p = n=(n   1).
Notice that with full market coverage, shifting the support of the match utility does
not a¤ect the equilibrium price.
In the following, we study two comparative static questions which are important for
our subsequent analysis.
Price and the number of rms. The rst question is: how does the equilibrium price
vary with the number of rms? Let us rewrite (1) as
p =
q(p)
jq0(p)j =
1=nR
f(x)dF (x)n 1
: (2)
The numerator is a rms equilibrium demand and it decreases with n. The denominator
is the absolute value of a rms equilibrium demand slope. It measures the density of a
12In the duopoly case Perlo¤ and Salop (1985) have shown that the pricing game has no asymmetric
equilibrium. Beyond duopoly Caplin and Nalebu¤ (1991) show that there is no asymmetric equilibrium
in the logit model. More recently Quint (2014) proves a general result (see Lemma 1 there) which
implies that our pricing game has no asymmetric equilibrium if f is log-concave.
13Caplin and Nalebu¤ (1991) provide a slightly weaker su¢ cient condition which requires f to be
  1n+1 -concave. Our subsequent analysis needs this to be true for any n, and when n ! 1 this
condition converges to zero-concavity or equivalently log-concavity.
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rms marginal consumers who are indi¤erent between its product and the best product
among its competitors. How the denominator changes with n depends on the shape
of f . For example, if the density f is increasing, it increases with n and so p must
decrease with n. Conversely if f is decreasing, it decreases with n, which works against
the demand size e¤ect. However, as long as the denominator does not decrease with
n too quickly, the equilibrium price decreases with n. The following result reports a
su¢ cient condition for that.
Lemma 1 Suppose 1   F is log-concave (which is implied by the log-concavity of f).
Then p dened in (1) decreases with n. Moreover, limn!1 p = 0 if and only if
limx!x
f(x)
1 F (x) =1.
Proof. Let x(n 1) be the second highest order statistic of fx1;    ; xng. Let F(n 1)
and f(n 1) be its CDF and density function, respectively. Using
f(n 1)(x) = n(n  1)(1  F (x))F (x)n 2f(x) ;
we can rewrite (1) as14
1
p
=
Z
f(x)
1  F (x)dF(n 1)(x) : (3)
Since x(n 1) increases in n in the sense of rst order stochastic dominance, p decreases
in n if the hazard rate f=(1 F ) is increasing (or equivalently, if 1 F is log-concave).
The limit result also follows from (3) because x(n 1) converges to x as n!1.
Anderson, de Palma, and Nesterov (1995) is the rst paper that proves this monotonic-
ity result (see their Proposition 1). Our proof is simpler than theirs. (Their proof
requires f to be log-concave, which is slightly stronger than 1  F being log-concave.)
More recently, Quint (2014) shows that when f is log-concave, prices are strategic
complements and the pricing game is supermodular in a general setting which allows
for asymmetric rms and the existence of an outside option. Then the monotonicity
result follows, since introducing an additional rm is the same as treating that rm
as an existing one which drops its price from innity to the equilibrium price level.15
Though less general, our method is simple and also o¤ers a tail behavior condition for
the markup to converge to zero in the limit.
14The right-hand side of (3) is the density of all marginal consumers in the market. A consumer is
a marginal one if her best product and second-best product have the same match utility. Conditional
on x(n 1) = x, the CDF of x(n) is
F (z) F (x)
1 F (x) for z  x, and so its density function at x(n) = x is the
hazard rate f(x)1 F (x) . Integrating this according to the distribution of x(n 1) yields the right-hand side
of (3). Dividing it by n gives the density of each rms marginal consumers (i.e., jq0(p)j).
15Weyl and Fabinger (2013) make a similar observation through the lens of pass-through rate: the
drop of one rms price induces other rms to lower their prices if pass-through is below 1, and with
a constant marginal cost this is true if demand is log-concave. Gabaix et al. (2015) show a similar
monotonicity result when n is su¢ ciently large.
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Notice that the log-concavity of 1   F is not a necessary condition. Even if 1   F
is not log-concave, it is still possible that price decreases with n.16 But if 1   F is
log-convex (and the equilibrium price is still determined by (1)), then the same proof
implies that p increases in n. The tail behavior condition for limn!1 p = 0 is satised
if f(x) > 0. But it can be violated if f(x) = 0. For instance, in the extreme value
distribution example we mentioned before, the price p = n=(n   1) converges to 1 in
the limit.
Price and the dispersion of consumer valuations. The second comparative static
question is: if the distribution of consumer valuations becomes less dispersedfrom f
to g as illustrated in Figure 1 below, how will the equilibrium price change? Intuitively,
less dispersed consumer valuations mean less product di¤erentiation across rms, and
so this should intensify price competition and induce a lower market price. (This must
be the case if the density g degenerates at one point such that all products become
homogenous.) However, this intuition is not totally right, and g does not necessarily
lead to a lower market price than f . As we show below, it depends on how to rank the
dispersion of two random variables.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0
1
2
f
x
g
Figure 1: An example of less dispersed consumer valuations
In the literature on stochastic orders there are several possible ways to rank the
dispersion of two random variables. (The classic reference on this topic is Chapter
3 in Shaked and Shanthikumar, 2007.) One of them is convex order. It is the most
familiar one for economists because it is equivalent to a mean-preserving spread when
two random variables have equal means.17 For example, f and g in Figure 1 can be
16One such example is the power distribution: F (x) = xk with k 2 ( 1n ; 1). In this example, 1  F is
neither log-concave nor log-convex. But one can check that the equilibrium price is p = nk 1n(n 1)k2 and
it decreases in n.
17Let xF and xG be two random variables, and let F and G be their CDFs, respectively. Then xG
is smaller than xF in the convex order (denoted as xG cx xF ) if E[(xG)]  E[(xF )] for any convex
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ranked in this order if they have equal means.18 However, as we will see below this
order usually does not ensure a clear-cut price comparison result.
Another one is dispersive order. A random variable xG is said to be smaller than xF
in the dispersive order (denoted as xG disp xF ) if G 1(t) G 1(t0)  F 1(t) F 1(t0)
for any 0 < t0  t < 1, where G and F are the CDFs of xG and xF , respectively. (This
means that the di¤erence between any two quantiles of G is smaller than the di¤erence
between the corresponding quantiles of F .) Dispersive order ensures a clear-cut price
comparison result as shown in the following result, but we will also see that it is in
general a too strong condition for our bundling application.19
Lemma 2 Consider two Perlo¤-Salop markets with consumer valuations denoted by xF
and xG, respectively. Let F and G be their CDFs, f and g be their density functions, and
[xF ; xF ] and [xG; xG] be their supports, respectively. Without loss of generality suppose
E[xF ] = E[xG]. Let pk, k = F;G, be the equilibrium price associated with xk. Suppose
both f and g are log-concave such that the equilibrium prices are determined as in (1).
(i) If xG is less dispersed than xF according to the dispersive order, then pG  pF for
any n  2.
(ii) However, if f(xF ) > g(xG), then there exists n^ such that pG > pF for n > n^.
Proof. Changing the integral variable from x to t = F (x), we get
1
pF
= n
Z xF
xF
f(x)dF (x)n 1 = n
Z 1
0
lF (t)dt
n 1 ;
where lF (t)  f(F 1(t)) and tn 1 is a CDF on [0; 1]. Similarly, we have
1
pG
= n
Z 1
0
lG(t)dt
n 1 ;
where lG(t)  g(G 1(t)). Then
pG  pF ,
Z 1
0
[lF (t)  lG(t)]dtn 1  0 : (4)
(i) xG disp xF if and only if F 1(t)   G 1(t) increases in t 2 (0; 1). This implies
that
dF 1(t)
dt
 dG
 1(t)
dt
, lF (t)  lG(t) :
function  whenever the expectations exist. When xF amd xG have equal means, the equivalence to
a mean-preserving spread is established in Theorem 3.A.1. in Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007).
18According to Theorem 3.A.44. in Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007), a su¢ cient condition for f to
be a mean-preserving spread of g when they have equal means is that f   g changes its sign twice in
the order +; ;+. (More generally two densities ranked by convex order can cross each other many
times.)
19When two random variables have equal means, dispersive order implies convex order. (See Theorem
3.B.16. in Shaked and Shanthikumar, 2007.) Ganuza and Penalva (2010) use these two ordering
concepts to study information disclosure in auctions.
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Therefore, pG  pF follows from (4). (In particular, xG disp xF implies lF (1)  lG(1),
or f(xF )  g(xG).)
(ii) f(xF ) > g(xG) implies lF (1)  lG(1) > 0. Then
lim
n!1
Z 1
0
[lF (t)  lG(t)]dtn 1 = lF (1)  lG(1) > 0 ;
since lF (t)   lG(t) is bounded (given we consider bounded density functions) and the
distribution tn 1 converges to the upper bound 1 as n ! 1. Then it follows from (4)
that pG > pF when n is su¢ ciently large.20
Result (i) shows that if one distribution is less dispersed than the other in the
dispersive order, the usual intuition works and less dispersed consumer valuations lead
to a lower market price. Perlo¤ and Salop (1985) show that if xG = xF with  2 (0; 1),
then pG < pF (more precisely, pG = pF ). This is a special case of result (i) since
x <disp x for any random variable x and constant  2 (0; 1). (Here <dispdenotes a
strict dispersive order.)
However, dispersive order is a relatively strong condition. When xF and xG have
the same nite support, xG disp xF requires F 1(t) G 1(t) increase in t 2 (0; 1), but
this implies F 1(t) = G 1(t) everywhere, i.e., the two random variables must be equal.
This excludes many natural cases where one random variable is intuitively less dispersed
than the other. For instance, the two distributions in Figure 1 cannot be ranked by the
dispersive order. (When xF and xG have equal means and their supports are intervals,
xG disp xF requires that the support of xG is a strict subset of the support of xF , or
both are innite supports.)
Notice that f(xF ) > g(xG) is not compatible with xG disp xF as we already see
from the proof. So result (ii) indicates that if we go beyond the dispersive order, even in
natural cases such as the example in Figure 1 where one distribution is intuitively less
dispersed than the other, the number of rms can matter for price comparison. When
there are su¢ ciently many rms, a less dispersed distribution can lead to a higher
market price. Since this result is crucial for understanding our price comparison result
in the pure bundling part, we explain its economic intuition in detail.
Let us consider the example in Figure 1 where f(1) > g(1). From (2) we already
know that equilibrium price equals the ratio of equilibrium demand to the negative of
equilibrium demand slope. Since equilibrium demand is always 1=n due to rm sym-
metry, only equilibrium demand slope (or the density of marginal consumers) matters
for price comparison. Let rm j be the rm in question. When n is large, a given
consumers valuation for the best product among rm js competitors must be close
20This argument cannot be extended to the case where f(xF ) = g(xG) but f > g for x close to the
upper bounds. If lF (1) = lG(1), then for a large n, [lF (t)  lG(t)](n 1)tn 2 is close to zero everywhere
(and it equals zero at t = 1). Then the sign of
R 1
0
[lF (t)  lG(t)]dtn 1 does not necessarily depend only
on the sign of lF (t)  lG(t) at t close to 1.
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to the upper bound 1 almost for sure. For that consumer to be rm js marginal con-
sumer, her valuation for its product should also be close to 1. In other words, when n
is large, a rms marginal consumers should be positioned close to the upper bound no
matter which density function applies. Since f(1) > g(1), we deduce that a rm has
fewer marginal consumers and so faces a less elastic demand when the density g applies.
Therefore, when n is large, the less dispersed density g leads to a higher market price.
(The intuition here is explained when n is large, but as we will see in the next section
the result can hold even for a small n.) Our discussion suggests that when the number
of rms is large, the tail behavior, instead of the peakedness, of the consumer valuation
density matters for price comparison.21
Lemma 2 has its own interest in the literature on oligopolistic price competition.
As well as its bundling application in the next section, it is useful for studying the
impact on price competition of rm or consumer activities (such as information dis-
closure/acquisition, advertising, product design, and spurious product di¤erentiation)
which can change the dispersion of consumer valuations in the market.
4 Pure Bundling
Now consider the regime where all rms adopt the pure bundling strategy. We assume
that consumers do not buy more than one bundle to mix and match by themselves.
This is naturally the case if pure bundling is caused by product incompatibility or
high shopping costs. When pure bundling is a pricing strategy, this assumption can
be justied if the bundle is too expensive (e.g., due to high production costs) relative
to the match utility improvement from mixing and matching. (If the unit production
cost is c for each product, a su¢ cient condition is c > x  x.) As we will discuss in the
conclusion, allowing consumers to buy multiple bundles will make the situation similar
to mixed bundling.
4.1 Equilibrium prices
Let Xj Pmi=1 xji be the match utility of rm js bundle, and let P be the equilibrium
bundle price. If rm j unilaterally deviates and charges P 0, the demand for its bundle
is
Q(P 0) = Pr[Xj   P 0 > max
k 6=j
fXk   Pg] = Pr[X
j
m
  P
0
m
> max
k 6=j
fX
k
m
  P
m
g] :
We divide everything by m because we want to compare the per-product bundle price
P=m with the single-product price p in the benchmark regime of separate sales. Let G
21Gabaix et al. (2015) study the asymptotic behavior of the equilibrium price and make a similar
point. By using extreme value theory they show that when the number of rms is large, the price is
proportional to [nf(F 1(1   1=n))] 1. By noticing R 1
0
tdtn 1 = 1   1=n, this can also be intuitively
seen from the proof of our Lemma 2.
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and g denote the CDF and density function of Xj=m, respectively. Then P=m is deter-
mined similarly as the separate sales price p, except that now a di¤erent distribution
G applies:
1
P=m
= n
Z
g(x)dG(x)n 1 : (5)
Notice that g is log-concave if f is log-concave (see, e.g., Miravete, 2002). Therefore,
the rst-order condition (5) is also su¢ cient for dening the equilibrium bundle price if
f is log-concave. Also notice that 1 G is log-concave if 1  F is log-concave. Hence,
similar results as in Lemma 1 hold here.
Lemma 3 Suppose 1   F is log-concave (which is implied by the log-concavity of f).
Then the bundle price P dened in (5) decreases with n. Moreover, limn!1 P = 0 if
and only if limx!x
g(x)
1 G(x) =1.
Notice that the per-product bundle valuationXj=m is a mean-preserving contraction
of xji (provided that the mean of x
j
i exists) and they have the same support. So g is
less dispersed than f as illustrated in Figure 1 above. In particular, g(x) = 0 even
if f(x) > 0 because Xj=m = x only if xji = x for all i = 1;    ;m. Intuitively this
is because nding a well-matched bundle is much harder than nding a well-matched
single product.22
4.2 Comparing prices and prots
From (1) and (5), we can see that the comparison between separate sales and pure
bundling is just a comparison between two Perlo¤-Salop models with two di¤erent
consumer valuation distributions F andG. According to result (i) in Lemma 2, bundling
reduces market price if Xj=m disp xji . However, Xj=m and xji often cannot be ranked
by the dispersive order (e.g., when xji has a nite support).
23 We will show that in the
duopoly case, bundling leads to lower prices even if Xj=m and xji are not ranked by
the dispersive order, but if we go beyond duopoly, result (ii) in Lemma 2 implies that
bundling can raise market prices.
Using the technique in the proof of Lemma 2, we have
P
m
 p,
Z 1
0
[lF (t)  lG(t)]tn 2dt  0 ; (6)
22Formally, when m = 2 the density function of (xj1 + x
j
2)=2 is g(x) = 2
R x
2x x f(2x   t)dF (t) for
x  (x+ x)=2, so g(x) = 0. A similar argument works for m  3.
23Given the further restriction here that Xj=m and xji have the same support and mean (which
means that F and G must cross each other at least once), they also cannot be ranked by the dispersive
order if xji has a semi-innite support with a nite lower bound or upper bound. Hence, the only case
where Xj=m and xji might be ranked by the dispersive order is when the support of x
j
i is the whole
real line. The only class of distributions for which this is the case is the stable distributions, as we will
discuss later.
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where lF (t) = f(F 1(t)) and lG(t) = g(G 1(t)). Given full market coverage, prot
comparison is the same as price comparison.
Proposition 1 Suppose f is log-concave.
(i) When n = 2, bundling reduces market prices and prots for any m  2.
(ii) For a xed m, if f(x) > 0, there exists n^ such that bundling increases market prices
and prots for n > n^ (and limn!1
P=m
p
=1). If f is further such that lF (t) and lG(t)
cross each other at most twice, then bundling decreases prices and prots if and only if
n  n^.
(iii) For a xed n, P=m decreases in m when m is large and limm!1 P=m = 0, so there
exists m^ such that bundling reduces market prices and prots for m > m^.
Result (i) generalizes the existing nding on how pure bundling a¤ects market prices
in duopoly. Bundling reduces price in duopoly if
R
f(x)2dx  R g(x)2dx. The intuition
is more transparent when the density function f is symmetric. In that case the average
position of marginal consumers is at the mean and g is more peaked than f at the
mean. Each rm therefore has more marginal consumers in the case of g, and so they
face a more elastic demand and charge lower prices.24
Result (iii) follows from the law of large numbers. Let  < 1 be the mean of xji .
Then Xj=m converges to  as m ! 1. In other words, with many products the per-
product valuation for the bundle tends to be homogeneous across both consumers and
rms. Then P=m must converge to zero.25
The rst part of result (ii) follows immediately from result (ii) in Lemma 2 as
f(x) > g(x) = 0. Bundling generates a thinner right tail of the valuation density, and
when n is large the marginal consumers are located on the right tail. Hence, bundling
reduces the number of marginal consumers, and this leads to a less elastic demand and
a higher market price. The limit result as n ! 1 indicates that the increase of price
caused by bundling can be proportionally signicant. (With f(x) > 0 both p and P=m
converge to zero, but they converge in di¤erent speeds.) Extra work is needed to prove
the cut-o¤ result in the second part. One way to interpret the economic meaning of
the condition f(x) > 0 is that the equilibrium price p in the regime of separate sales
converges to the marginal cost fast enough (at a speed of 1=n).26
To illustrate the cut-o¤result, consider two examples which satisfy all the conditions
needed in result (ii). In the uniform distribution example with f(x) = 1, P=m < p if
n  6. Figure 2(a) below describes how both prices vary with n (where the solid curve
24Notice that we are calculating P=m instead of the bundle price P . So a rms marginal consumers
in the bundling case are those who will switch when the rm changes P=m by a small ".
25Nalebu¤ (2000) shows a similar result in a multi-dimensional Hotelling model with two rms, an
arbitrary number of products, and consumers uniformly distributed inside a hypercube.
26As we discussed in footnote 21, when n is large the equilibrium price p is proportional to
[nf(F 1(1  1=n))] 1. When f(x) > 0, this converges to zero at a speed of 1=n.
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is p and the dashed one is P=m). In the example with an increasing density f(x) = 4x3,
as described in Figure 2(b) below P=m < p only if n = 2. These examples show that
the threshold n^ can be small.
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(a) f(x) = 1
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
price
n
(b) f(x) = 4x3
Figure 2: Price comparison with m = 2
Result (ii) in Proposition 1 requires f(x) > 0. If f(x) = 0 (where x can be innity),
then f(x) = g(x) and the result may not hold any more. For instance, in the example
of normal distribution where limx!1 f(x) = 0, bundling always lowers market prices.
Example of normal distribution. We already know that with full market coverage,
shifting the support of the match utility distribution does not a¤ect the equilib-
rium price. So let us normalize the mean to zero and suppose xji s N (0; 2).
Then the separate sales price dened in (1) is
p =

n
R1
 1 (x)d(x)
n 1 ; (7)
where  and  are the CDF and density function of the standard normal distribu-
tion N (0; 1), respectively. The denition of Xj implies that Xj=m s N (0; 2=m).
Thus, Xj=m = xji=
p
m <disp x
j
i , so result (i) in Lemma 2 implies P=m < p. That
is, in this example bundling always reduces market prices (and so prots) regard-
less of n and m.27 A more precise relationship between the two prices is available:
Firm js demand in the bundling regime, when it unilaterally deviates to price
P 0, is
Q(P 0) = Pr[
Xj
m
  P
0
m
> max
k 6=j
fX
k
m
  P
m
g] = Pr[xji  
P 0p
m
> max
k 6=j
fxki  
Pp
m
g] :
27However, for any truncated normal distribution with a nite upper bound, result (ii) in Proposition
1 still applies. For instance, for the truncated standard normal with support [ 1; 1] bundling leads to
a higher market price if n > 9.
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This equals the demand for rm js product i in the separate sales regime when
rm j charges P 0=
p
m and other rms charge P=
p
m. Then we deduce that
Pp
m
= p : (8)
In this normal distribution example, bundling also makes the right tail thinner (i.e.,
g(x) < f(x) for large x) and the (average) position of marginal consumers also moves
to the right as n increases. However, with an unbounded support the relative moving
speed now matters. The density tail is higher in the separate sales case, and so it is
more likely to have a high valuation draw. This implies that the position of marginal
consumers moves to the right faster in the separate sales regime than in the bundling
regime. Hence, even if f(x) > g(x), it is possible that f(x^f ) < g(x^g) where x^f and
x^g denote the (average) position of marginal consumers in the separate sales and the
bundling regime, respectively. This cannot happen if the upper bound x is nite and
f(x) > g(x). In that case, when n is large both x^f and x^g will be close to x, and so we
must have f(x^f ) > g(x^g). Nevertheless, in the case with an innite upper bound, even
if both x^f and x^g move to innity they can still be su¢ ciently far away from each other
such that f(x^f ) < g(x^g).
The key feature in the normal distribution example is that xji and X
j=m belong
to the same class of distributions, such that the dispersive order result in Lemma 2
can apply. More generally this is a property of stable distributions.28 Three notable
examples of stable distributions are normal, Cauchy, and Lévy. Suppose xji has a
stable distribution with a stability parameter  2 (0; 2] and a location parameter zero.
(Normal distribution has  = 2, Cauchy distribution has  = 1, and Lévy distribution
has  = 1=2.) Then using the results in Chapter 1.6 in Nolan (2015) one can show that
Xj=m = m
1

 1xji . Therefore, X
j=m disp xji and bundling reduces market prices if
  1. (In the edge case with  = 1, i.e., with the Cauchy distribution, bundling does
not a¤ect market prices.) If  < 1, bundling raises market prices. (Note that this does
not contradict with the duopoly result in Proposition 1 because a stable distribution
with  < 1 does no longer have a log-concave density.)29
Finally, we want to point out that f(x) > 0 (or a nite x) is not necessary for
bundling to raise market prices even if we keep the log-concavity condition. For instance,
consider the distribution with a log-concave density f(x) = 2(1   x) on [0; 1]. In this
example, f(x) = 0, but numerical simulations suggest a similar price comparison result
28Let x1 and x2 be independent copies of a random variable x. Then x is said to be stable if for any
constants a > 0 and b > 0 the random variable ax1 + bx2 has the same distribution as cx+ d for some
constants c > 0 and d.
29All the discussion here is subject to the qualication that for some stable distributions, the rst-
order condition may not be su¢ cient for dening the equilibrium price or the integral in the rst-order
condition may not even exist.
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as in Figure 2 (though the threshold n^ is bigger).30 There are also examples with
x =1 and a log-concave density where bundling can raise market prices. For instance,
consider the generalized normal distribution with density f(x) = 
2 (1=)
e jxj

, where 
is the shape parameter and the support is the whole real line. (The density function is
log-concave when  > 1.) This distribution becomes the standard normal when  = 2,
and it converges to the uniform distribution on [ 1; 1] when  !1. Suppose n^ is the
threshold in the case of uniform distribution with support [ 1; 1]. Then for any n > n^,
there must exist a su¢ ciently large  such that bundling raises market prices.
4.3 Comparing consumer surplus and total welfare
With full market coverage, consumer payment is a pure transfer and so total welfare
(which is the sum of rm prots and consumer surplus) only reects the match quality
between consumers and products. Since pure bundling eliminates the opportunities for
consumers to mix and match, it must reduce match quality and so total welfare.
However, the comparison of consumer surplus can be more complicated. If pure
bundling increases market prices, then it must harm consumers since consumers su¤er
from both higher prices and having no opportunities to mix and match. The trickier
situation is when pure bundling lowers market prices (e.g., when n = 2, m is large, or
the distribution is normal). In that case there is a trade-o¤ between the negative match
quality e¤ect and the positive price e¤ect. The main message in this section is that
even if bundling intensies price competition, the negative match quality e¤ect often
dominates such that bundling harms consumers when the number of rms is above a
usually small threshold.
The per-product consumer surplus in the regime of separate sales and pure bundling
are respectively
E

max
j
fxjig

  p and E

max
j

Xj
m

  P
m
:
Then pure bundling benets consumers if and only if
E

max
j
fxjig

  E

max
j

Xj
m

< p  P
m
: (9)
The left-hand side (which must be positive) reects the match quality e¤ect, and the
right-hand side is the price e¤ect.
Proposition 2 Suppose f is log-concave.
(i) For a xed m, if f(x) > 0, or if limx!x ddx(
1 F (x)
f(x)
) = 0, there exists n^ such that
bundling harms consumers if n > n^.
30In fact, it can be shown that if f(x) = 0 but f 0(x) < 0, we still have the result that bundling raises
market prices when n is above a certain threshold. The proof, though less transparent, is available
upon request.
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(ii) There exists n such that (a) for n  n, there exists m^(n) such that bundling
benets consumers if m > m^(n), and (b) for n > n, there exists m^(n) such that
bundling harms consumers if m > m^(n).
From the price comparison result (ii) in Proposition 1, we know that if f(x) > 0
bundling will raise prices (and so harm consumers) when n is su¢ ciently large. If
f(x) = 0 (e.g., when x = 1), bundling may lower prices. But the negative match
quality e¤ect will always dominate when n is su¢ ciently large if the second condition
in result (i) holds (which is true for many often used distributions such as normal,
exponential, extreme value, and logistic). The is easy to understand when x = 1. In
that case, the di¤erence between E

maxjfxjig

and E
h
maxj
n
Xj
m
oi
can go to innity
as n ! 1, while the price di¤erence is always nite since both prices decrease with n
under the log-concavity condition.
Result (ii) says that in the limit case with m!1 we have a stronger cut-o¤ result:
pure bundling improves consumer welfare if and only if the number of rms is below
some threshold. Notice that in the limit case with m!1 we have limm!1Xj=m = 
and limm!1 P=m = 0. Then for xed n, bundling benets consumers if and only if
E

max
j
fxjig

   < p : (10)
The match quality e¤ect on the left-hand side increases with n, while the price e¤ect
decreases with n. In the proof we show that (10) holds for n = 2 but fails for a
su¢ ciently large n. This proves the cut-o¤ result. Intuitively, when the number of
rms increases, bundling deprives consumers of more and more opportunities to mix
and match, such that eventually the match quality e¤ect dominates. The threshold
n is typically small. For example, in the uniform distribution case with F (x) = x,
condition (10) simplies to n2   3n  2 < 0, which holds only for n  3.
For a smallm it appears di¢ cult to prove a cut-o¤ result.31 Figure 3 below describes
how consumer surplus varies with n in the uniform distribution case whenm = 2 (where
the solid curve is for separate sales, and the dashed one is for bundling). The threshold
is also 3.32
31For a nite m, we have examples where bundling harms consumers even in the duopoly case. One
such example is when m = 2 and the distribution is exponential.
32In this example, the harm of bundling will disappear eventually as n ! 1. This is because
limn!1 p = limn!1 P=m = 0 and limn!1 E[maxjfxjig] = limn!1 E[maxj

Xj=m
	
] = x. But for
a not too large n, the harm of bundling on consumers can be signicant. For example, when n = 10
bundling reduces consumer surplus by about 15%.
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Figure 3: Consumer surplus comparison with uniform distribution and m = 2
A similar cut-o¤ result holds in the normal distribution example for any m  2.
Example of normal distribution. Suppose xji s N (0; 2). From (8) and (9), we
can see that pure bundling improves consumer surplus in this example if and only
if
E

max
j
fxjig

  E

max
j

Xj
m

< p[1  1p
m
] : (11)
In the Appendix, we show that
E

max
j
fxjig

=
2
p
; E

max
j

Xj
m

=
1p
m
2
p
: (12)
Then (11) simplies to p > . Using (7), one can check that this holds only for
n = 2; 3, so the threshold is also 3.
4.4 Incentive to bundle
This section studies rmsincentive to bundle. Consider an extended game where rms
can choose both whether to bundle their products and what prices to set. When there
are more than two products, for tractability we assume that each rm either bundles
all its products or not at all and there are no ner bundling strategies (by which a rm
sells some products in a package but sells others separately). The pricing game where
rms adopt asymmetric partial bundling strategies is hard to analyze.
If rms can collectively choose their bundling strategies, Proposition 1 implies that
they tend to choose separate sales when n is small but pure bundling when n is large.
The outcome is di¤erent if rms choose their bundling strategies non-cooperatively. In
the following, we will focus on the case where rms choose bundling strategies and
prices simultaneously. This captures the situations where it is relatively easy to adjust
the bundling strategy.
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Proposition 3 Suppose f is log-concave and rms make bundling and pricing decisions
simultaneously.
(i) It is a Nash equilibrium that all rms choose to bundle their products and charge
the bundle price P dened in (5). When n = 2, this is the unique (pure-strategy) Nash
equilibrium if p 6= P=m.
(ii) There exists ~n such that (a) for n  ~n, there exists ~m(n) such that separate sales
is not a Nash equilibrium if m > ~m(n), and (b) for n > ~n, there exists ~m(n) such that
separate sales is also a Nash equilibrium if m > ~m(n).
It is easy to understand that it is a Nash equilibrium that all rms bundle. This is
simply because in our model if a rm unilaterally unbundles, the market situation does
not change for consumers.33 In the duopoly case, it can be further shown that neither
separate sales nor asymmetric equilibria (where one rm bundles and the other does
not) can arise in the market.
When there are more than two rms, one may wonder whether separate sales can
be another equilibrium as well. Result (ii) says that when m ! 1, this is the case
if and only if n is above some threshold. The intuition of why the number of rms
matters is that the more rms in the market, the worse a rms bundle appears when
it unilaterally bundles. (This is not true in the duopoly case where one rm bundling
is the same as both rms bundling.) More formally, suppose that all other rms o¤er
separate sales at price p, but rm j bundles unilaterally. Denote by
yi  max
k 6=j
fxki g (13)
the maximum match utility of product i among rm js competitors. Then rm j is
as if competing with one rm that o¤ers a bundle with match utility Y Pmi=1 yi and
price mp. If rm j charges the same bundle price mp, its demand will be
Pr(Xj > Y )  Pr(Xj > max
k 6=j
fXkg) = 1
n
: (14)
The inequality is because Y is greater than maxk 6=jfXkg stochastically, and it is strict
when n  3. Thus, without further price adjustment it cannot be protable for rm j
to unilaterally bundle.
Suppose now rm j also adjusts its price. It is more convenient to rephrase the
problem into a monopoly one where a consumers net valuation for product i is ui 
xi  (yi  p). (Here yi  p is regarded as the outside option to product i.) If rm j does
not bundle, then its optimal separate sales price is p and its prot from each product
is p=n. But its optimal prot when it bundles is hard to calculate in general, except in
the limit case with m ! 1. In this limit case, according to the law of large numbers
33This argument depends on the assumptions that consumers buy all products and for each product
they only buy one variant.
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rm j can extract all surplus by charging a bundle price mE[ui] and its per product
prot will be E[ui] =    E[yi] + p.34 This is no greater than the separate sales prot
(and so rm j has no unilateral incentive to bundle) if and only if
(1  1
n
)p < E[yi]   =
Z 
F (x)  F (x)n 1 dx : (15)
This is clearly not true for n = 2 (which is consistent with result (i) in Proposition 3).
In the proof, we show that this is true if and only if n is above a certain threshold.
(This argument assumes E[ui] > 0. If E[ui]  0 (which occurs if n is su¢ ciently large),
then rm j of course has no incentive to bundle.)
The threshold ~n in result (ii) is usually small. For instance, with a uniform distri-
bution (15) becomes n2   4n + 2 > 0 and so ~n = 3. This is the same as the threshold
n in the consumer surplus comparison result in Proposition 2. This means that in this
uniform example with a large number of products, separate sales is another equilibrium
outcome if and only if consumers prefer separate sales to pure bundling. In other words,
with a proper equilibrium selection the market itself can work well for consumers. The
same is true in the normal distribution example. (But this is not generally true. We
have examples, for instance, f(x) = 2(1  x), where ~n 6= n.)
Possibility of asymmetric equilibria. With more than two rms one may also wonder
the possibility of asymmetric equilibria where some rms bundle and the others do not.
An analytical investigation into this problem is hard because the pricing equilibrium
when rms adopt asymmetric bundling strategies does not have a simple characteriza-
tion.35 However, numerical analysis can be done. Let us illustrate by a uniform example
with n = 3 and m = 2. In this example, we can claim that there are no asymmetric
equilibria.
The rst possible asymmetric equilibrium is that one rm bundles and the other
two do not. In this hypothetical equilibrium, the bundling rm charges P  0:513 and
earns a prot about 0:176, and the other two rms charge a separate price p  0:317
34This simplicity of optimal pricing with many products has been explored by Armstrong (1999)
and Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999). Fang and Norman (2006) have studied the protability of pure
bundling in the monopoly case with a nite number of products. They assume that the density of ui
is log-concave and symmetric. In our model, the log-concavity is guaranteed if f is log-concave, but
the density of ui is not symmetric when n  3 (because yi is stochastically greater than xi). Without
symmetry the Proschan (1965) result that
Pm
i=1 ui=m is more peaked than ui does not hold any more.
(The Proschan result has been extended in various ways, but not when the density is asymmetric.)
The analysis in Fang and Norman (2006), however, crucially relies on that result. That is why their
monopoly result cannot be applied to our competition model directly.
35The reason is that when some rms bundle, other rms will treat their products as complements,
and this will complicate the demand analysis. To see this, let us suppose rm 1 bundles while other
rms do not. When rm k 6= 1 lowers its price for product i, some consumers will stop buying rm 1s
bundle and switch to buying all products from the other rms. This will increase the demand for all of
rm ks products. (The details on the demand calculation and the rst-order conditions are available,
but no further analytical progress can be made.)
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and each earns a prot about 0:208. But if the bundling rm unbundles and charges
the same separate price as the other two rms, it will have a demand 1
3
, and its prot
will rise to about 0:211.
The second possible asymmetric equilibrium is that two rms bundle and the third
one does not. Then the situation is like all rms are bundling. Each bundling rm
charges a bundle price P = 0:5, the third rm charges two single-product prices such
that p1+p2 = 0:5, and each rm has market share 13 . But if one bundling rm unbundles
and o¤ers the same separate prices as the third rm, as we already know from (14),
the remaining bundling rm will have a demand less than 1
3
. This implies that the
deviation rm will have a demand greater than 1
3
and so earn a higher prot. (This
argument actually does not depend on the uniform distribution and m = 2.)
4.5 Discussions
4.5.1 Asymmetric products and correlated valuations
We now consider a more general setting where a rms m products are potentially
asymmetric and their match utilities are potentially correlated. Let xj = (xj1;    ; xjm)
be a consumers valuations for the m products at rm j. Suppose that xj is still i.i.d.
across rms and consumers, and it is distributed according to a joint CDF F (x1;    ; xm)
with support S  Rm and a bounded joint density function f(x1;    ; xm). Let Fi and
fi, i = 1;    ;m, be the marginal CDF and density function of xji , and let [xi; xi] be its
support. Let G and g be the CDF and density function of Xj=m, where Xj =
Pm
i=1 x
j
i
as before, and let [x; x] be its support. All fi and g are log-concave if the joint density
function f is log-concave. Then the equilibrium price in each regime is dened similarly
as before:
1
pi
= n
Z xi
xi
fi(x)dFi(x)
n 1; i = 1;    ;m; 1
P=m
=
Z x
x
g(x)dG(x)n 1 :
The limit result that limm!1 P=m = 0 still holds as long as Xj=m converges to a
deterministic value as m!1. So for a xed n, bundling lowers market price when m
is su¢ ciently large. Under similar conditions as before, we also have the result that for
a xed m bundling raises market prices when n is su¢ ciently large. (We have not been
able to extend the duopoly result in this general setting. See the online appendix for a
discussion.)
Proposition 4 Suppose f is log-concave. Suppose S  Rm is compact, strictly convex,
and has full dimension. Then for a xed m,
(i) if fi(xi) > 0, there exists n^i such that P=m > pi for n > n^i;
(ii) if fi(xi) > 0 for all i = 1;    ;m, there exists n^ such that P >
Pm
i=1 pi for n > n^.
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Proof. Our conditions imply that g(x) = 0 (e.g., see the proof of Proposition 1 in
Armstrong, 1996).36 Then the results immediately follow from result (ii) in Lemma 2.
The normal distribution example can also be extended to this general case. Suppose
xj  N (0;), where 2i in  is the variance of xji and ik in  is the covariance of
(xji ; x
j
k). Then X
j=m  N (0; (Pmi=1 2i +Pi6=k ik)=m2). According to formula (7),
P <
Pm
i=1 pi if and only if
Pm
i=1 
2
i +
P
i6=k ik < (
Pm
i=1 i)
2. Given ik  ik for
any i 6= k, this condition must hold provided that at least one pair of (xji ; xjk) is not
perfectly correlated.
4.5.2 Without full market coverage
We now return to the baseline model but relax the assumption of full market coverage.
A subtle issue here is whether the m products are independent products or perfect
complements (e.g., the essential components of a system). This will a¤ect the analysis
of the separate sales benchmark. If the m products are independent, consumers decide
whether to buy each product separately. If the m products are perfect complements,
then whether to buy a product also depends on how well-matched the other products
are. (With full market coverage, this distinction does not matter.) In the following we
consider the case of independent products for simplicity.
Suppose now a consumer buys a product or bundle only if it is the best o¤er in the
market and provides a positive surplus. To make the case interesting, let us suppose
x  0 but the mean of xji is positive, such that some consumers do not buy but the
market is still active.
In the regime of separate sales, if rm j unilaterally deviates and charges p0 for its
product i, the demand for its product i is
q(p0) = Pr[xji   p0 > max
k 6=j
f0; xki   pg] =
Z x
p0
F (xji   p0 + p)n 1dF (xji ) :
One can check that the rst-order condition for p to be the equilibrium price is
p =
q(p)
jq0(p)j =
[1  F (p)n]=n
F (p)n 1f(p)| {z }
exclusion e¤ect
+
R x
p
f(x)dF (x)n 1| {z }
competition e¤ect
: (16)
(If f is log-concave, this is also su¢ cient for dening the equilibrium price.) In equilib-
rium, a consumer will leave the market without purchasing product i with probability
36Formally, g(x) = lim"!0
1 G(x ")
" , and our conditions about S ensure that 1   G(x   ") = o(").
Among the conditions, strict convexity of S excludes the possibility that the plane of Xj=m = x
coincides with a part of Ss boundary, and the full dimension condition excludes the possibility that
xji , i = 1;    ;m, are perfectly correlated.
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F (p)n (i.e., when each product i has a valuation less than p). Given the symmetry of
rms, the numerator in (16) is the equilibrium demand for each rms product i. The
denominator is the negative of the demand slope, and it now has two parts: (i) The
rst term is the standard market exclusion e¤ect. When the valuations of all other
rmsproduct i are below p (which occurs with probability F (p)n 1), rm j acts as a
monopoly. Raising its price p by " will exclude "f(p) consumers from the market. (ii)
The second term is the same competition e¤ect as in the case with full market coverage
(up to the adjustment that a marginal consumers valuation must be greater than p).
Similarly, in the bundling case the equilibrium per-product bundle price P=m is
determined by the rst-order condition:
P
m
=
[1 G(P=m)n]=n
G(P=m)n 1g(P=m) +
R x
P=m
g(x)dG(x)n 1
; (17)
where G and g are the CDF and density function of Xj=m as before.
Unlike the case with full market coverage, the equilibrium price in each regime is
now implicitly determined in the corresponding rst-order condition. The following
result reports the condition for each rst-order condition to have a unique solution.
(See the online appendix for the proof.)
Lemma 4 Suppose f is log-concave. There is a unique equilibrium price p 2 (0; pM)
dened in (16), where pM is the monopoly price solving pM = [1  F (pM)]=f(pM), and
p decreases with n. Similar results hold for P=m dened in (17).
For a xed n < 1, we still have limm!1 P=m = 0 since Xj=m converges to the
mean as m!1. For a xed m <1, if n is large, the demand size di¤erence between
the two numerators in (16) and (17) becomes negligible and so is the exclusion e¤ect
di¤erence in the denominators. Therefore, price comparison is again determined by the
comparison of f(x) and g(x). Intuitively, when there are many varieties in the market,
almost every consumer can nd something she likes and so almost no consumers will
leave the market without purchasing anything. Then the situation will be close to
the case with full market coverage. Consequently we have a similar result that when
f(x) > 0, bundling raises market prices when n is greater than a certain threshold.
(We have not been able to extend the duopoly result in this setting without full market
coverage.)
Figure 4 below reports the impacts of pure bundling on market prices, prots, con-
sumer surplus, and total welfare in the uniform example with F (x) = x and m = 2.
(The solid curves are for separate sales, and the dashed ones are for pure bundling.)
They are qualitatively similar as those in the case with full market coverage. In par-
ticular, the total welfare result is similar even if we introduce the exclusion e¤ect of
price.
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Figure 4: The impact of pure bundling uniform distribution example without full
market coverage
An alternative way to introduce the exclusion e¤ect of price is to consider elastic
demand. In the online appendix, we extend the baseline model by considering elastic
consumer demand and show that the basic insights remain unchanged.
4.6 Related literature
Pure bundling or product incompatibility with product di¤erentiation. Matutes and
Regibeau (1988) initiated the study of competitive pure bundling in the context of
product compatibility. They study the 2 2 case in a two-dimensional Hotelling model
where consumers are uniformly distributed on a square. They show that bundling
lowers market prices and prots, and it also benets consumers if the market is fully
covered. Our analysis in the duopoly case has generalized their results by considering
more products and more general distributions.
Hurkens, Jeon, and Menicucci (2013) extend Matutes and Regibeau (1988) to the
case with two asymmetric rms where one rm produces higher-quality products than
the other. Consumers are distributed on the Hotelling square according to a symmetric
distribution, and the quality premium is captured by a higher basic valuation for each
product. Under certain technical assumptions Hurkens et al. show that when the
quality di¤erence is su¢ ciently large, pure bundling raises both rmsprots. (They do
not state a formal result concerning price comparison.) Our comparison results beyond
duopoly have a similar intuition as theirs. In our model, for each given consumer a rm
is competing with the best product among its competitors. When the number of rms
increases, the best rival product improves, and so the asymmetry between the rm and
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its strongest competitor expands. This has a similar e¤ect as increasing rm asymmetry
in Hurkens, Jeon, and Menicucci (2013) and shifts the position of marginal consumers
to the tail. These two papers are complementary in the sense that they point out that
either rm asymmetry or having more (symmetric) rms can reverse the usual result
that pure bundling intensies price competition. However, to accommodate more rms
and more products we have adopted a di¤erent modelling approach. Our model is also
more general in other aspects. For example, we can allow for asymmetric products with
correlated valuations, and we can also allow for a not fully-covered market or elastic
demand.
In the context of product compatibility in systems markets, Economides (1989)
studies a spatial model of competitive pure bundling with an arbitrary number of rms
and each selling two products. Specically, consumers are distributed uniformly on the
surface of a sphere and rms are symmetrically located on a great circle (in the spirit of
the Salop circular city model). He shows that for a regular transportation cost function,
pure bundling always reduces market prices relative to separate sales. His spatial model
features local competition: each rm is directly competing with its two neighbor rivals
only (regardless of the separate sales regime or the bundling regime),37 and they are
always symmetric to each other no matter how many rms in total are present in
the market. Conversely our random utility model features global competition: each
rm is directly competing with all other rms. When there are more rms, each rm is
e¤ectively competing with a stronger competitor. It is this expanding asymmetry, which
does not exist in Economidess spatial model, that drives our result that the impact of
pure bundling can be reversed when the number of rms is above a threshold.
In a recent independent work, Kim and Choi (2015) propose an alternative n  2
spatial model. They assume that consumers are uniformly distributed and rms are
symmetrically located on the surface of a torus. (Notice that rms can be symmetrically
located in many possible ways in this model.) For a quardratic transportation cost
function, they show that when there are four or more rms in the market, there exists
at least one symmetric location of rms under which making the products incompatible
across rms raises prices and prots. This is consistent with our comparison result
when f(x) > 0. Compared to Economides (1989), a key di¤erence in their model, using
the insight learned from our paper, is that each rm can directly compete with more
rms when the number of rms increases if we carefully select the location of rms. In
this sense, their model is closer to our random utility model.
We have proposed a random utility approach to study competitive bundling. Our
analysis has generated useful insights which can help us understand the discrepancy
among the existing models and results. Whether a spatial model or a random utility
model is more appropriate may depend on the context. But the random utility model
37The consumers around the two polars should compare all rms, but they are ignored in the analysis.
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is more exible and easier to use. The analysis of pure bundling is much simpler in our
framework than in the above spatial models. Our framework can also accommodate
more than two products, and it can even be used to study competitive mixed bundling
as we will see in the next section. Neither of them is easy to deal with in a spatial
model with more than two rms. The random utility approach also accords well with
econometric models of discrete consumer choice. In addition, neither Economides (1989)
nor Kim and Choi (2015) investigate rmsindividual incentives to bundle.
Pure bundling in auctions. Our study of competitive pure bundling is also related to
the literature on multi-object auctions with bundling. Consider a private-value second-
price auction where a bidders valuation for each object is i.i.d. across objects and
bidders. (The auction format does not matter given the revenue equivalence result.)
Palfrey (1983) show that if there are only two bidders, selling all the objects in a package
is more protable than selling them separately, while the opposite is true when the
number of bidders is su¢ ciently large. The revenue from selling the objects separately
is equal to the sum of the second highest valuations for each product. While the revenue
from selling them together in a bundle is equal to the second highest valuation for the
bundle. With only two bidders the second highest valuation is the minimum one, so
the revenue must be higher in the bundling case. With many bidders, however, the
second highest valuation is close to the maximum one, so the revenue must be higher
with separate sales. (In this limit case, bidders information rent disappears, and so
only the allocation e¢ ciency matters for the revenue. Then bundling clearly reduces
allocation e¢ ciency.) In the two-object case, Chakraborty (1999) further show a cut-o¤
result under certain regularity conditions.
Notice that the seller in an auction is like a consumer in our price competition
model, and the agents on the other side of the market are competing for her. Hence,
revenue comparison in auctions is related to consumer surplus comparison (instead of
price and prot comparison) in our model. The analysis in an auction model does not
directly apply to our price competition model. Competition occurs on the informed side
in auctions but on the uninformed side in our price competition model. In the auction
model, since we can focus on the second-price auction, the equilibrium bidding strategy
is simple and all analysis can be conducted based on the order statistic of the second
highest valuation. In our model as we have seen in (3) the equilibrium price is related
to the second order statistic in a more complex way. For this reason, our analysis is
less straightforward than in the auction case, and the main economic insight about
how bundling a¤ects price competition in our model does not exist in the bundling
literature.38
38As we mentioned before, product information disclosure can a¤ect consumer valuation distribution
in a similar way as pure bundling does. The same analogy applies in the auction case. Among the
works that study information disclosure in auctions, Board (2009) and Ganuza and Penalva (2010)
are the two most related papers. Both of them show that whether or not the auctioneer benets from
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Pure bundling with homogenous products and heterogeneous costs. In the literature
on competitive bundling, the standard approach that makes bundling a meaningful
issue to study is to consider a market with horizontal production di¤erentiation. We
have followed that tradition, though we have adopted a random utility model instead
of a spatial one. There is, however, an alternative modelling approach which considers
homogeneous products with heterogeneous costs across rms. A simple setting is to
assume that consumers have an identical (high) valuation for all products but the unit
production cost is i.i.d. across rms and products and that each rm has private
cost realizations. Competition now occurs on the informed side, and so the situation
is actually like a rst-price procurement auction. Since the outcome is the same as
in a second-price auction, the above argument for auctions implies that consumers
must benet from bundling in duopoly but su¤er when there are many rms.39 Given
total welfare is always lower with bundling, we can deduce that rms must su¤er from
bundling in the duopoly case. When the number of rms is su¢ ciently large, as in
result (ii) of Proposition 1 we can show that the opposite is true if the cost density
function is strictly positive at the lower bound.
Farrell, Monroe, and Saloner (1998) o¤ers a model in this vein. They compare
protability of two forms of vertical organization of industry: open organization (which
can be interpreted as separate sales) vs closed organization (which can be interpreted
as pure bundling). The di¤erence is that they assume a Bertrand price competition
among rms with public cost information. Then the rm with the lowest cost wins
the whole market and charges a price equal to the second lowest cost. This setting
generates the same ex ante outcome as in the private cost setting. In the n  2 case
they show a similar prot comparison result.
5 Mixed Bundling
We now turn to mixed bundling. Mixed bundling is a pricing strategy intended to
screen consumers by o¤ering more purchase options. In a competition environment,
mixed bundling can induce more consumers to one-stop shop. Mixed bundling is harder
to deal with than pure bundling because it leads to a more complicated pricing strategy
space, especially when the number of products is large. For this reason, we will focus on
the case where each rm supplies two products only. Then a mixed bundling strategy
can be described by a pair of stand-alone prices (1; 2) and a joint-purchase discount
 > 0. If a consumer buys both products from the same rm, she pays 1+ 2  . For
simplicity we will also return to the baseline model with full market coverage and i.i.d.
publicly providing more information to bidders depends on the number of bidders as in Palfrey (1983).
Board (2009) points out the connection between bundling and information disclosure.
39Chen and Li (2015) study bundling in a multiproduct procurement. They focus on the duopoly
case, but they allow for correlated production costs in each rm and a not fully-covered market.
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match utilities.
All the existing research on competitive mixed bundling focuses on the duopoly
case. See, for example, Matutes and Regibeau (1992), Anderson and Leruth (1993),
Thanassoulis (2007), and Armstrong and Vickers (2010). Armstrong and Vickers (2010)
consider the most general setup so far in the literature. They allow for asymmetric
products, correlated valuations, and the existence of an exogenous shopping cost. They
also consider an elastic demand and a general nonlinear pricing schedule. Our paper is
the rst to consider more than two rms, but in other aspects we focus on the relatively
simple setup. As we will see below, solving the mixed bundling pricing game becomes
much harder when we go beyond the duopoly case. One contribution of this paper is
to propose a way to solve the problem, and when the number of rms is large we also
o¤er a simple approximation of the equilibrium prices.
In the following, we will rst investigate rms incentives to use mixed bundling.
We will then characterize the symmetric pricing equilibrium with mixed bundling and
examine the impact of mixed bundling relative to separate sales.
5.1 Incentive to use mixed bundling
In the pure bundling case, we have shown that whether a rm has a unilateral incentive
to bundle its products depends on the number of rms in the market. However, when
mixed bundling is possible, the following result shows that each rm always has an in-
dividual incentive to introduce mixed bundling, regardless of the number of rms. This
implies that when mixed bundling is feasible, separate sales cannot be an equilibrium
outcome.
Proposition 5 Starting from separate sales with price dened in (1), each rm has a
strict unilateral incentive to introduce mixed bundling.
Proof. Suppose rm j unilaterally deviates from separate sales and introduces a
small joint-purchase discount  (but keeps its stand-alone price p unchanged). We aim
to show that this deviation is protable.
The negative (rst-order) e¤ect of this deviation is that rm j earns  less from
those consumers who buy both products from it. In the regime of separate sales, the
measure of those consumers is 1=n2 and so the loss is =n2.
The positive e¤ect is that now more consumers buy both products from rm j.
Recall that
yi  max
k 6=j
fxki g
denotes the match utility of the best product i among all other rms and its CDF is
F (yi)
n 1. For a given realization of (y1; y2) from other rms, Figure 5 below depicts how
the small deviation a¤ects consumer demand, where 
i, i = 1; 2, indicates consumers
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who buy only product i from rm j, and 
b indicates consumers who buy both products
from rm j.
x1
x2
y2
y1

b
2

1
y1   
y2   
ppppppppppppppppppppp
ppppppppppppppppppppp
ppppppppppppppppppppp pppppppppppppppppppp pppppppppppppppppppp ppppppppppppppppppppp
buy both from
other rms
Figure 5: The impact of a small joint-purchase discount on demand
When rm j introduces the small discount , the region of 
b expands, but both 
1 and

2 shrink accordingly. The shaded area indicates the increased measure of consumers
who buy both products from rm j: those on the two rectangle areas switch from
buying only one product to buying both from rm j, and those on the small triangle
area switch from buying nothing to buying both products from rm j.
Notice that the small triangle area is a second-order e¤ect when  is small, so
only the two rectangle areas matter. The measure of consumers on these two areas is
[f(y1)(1 F (y2)) + f(y2)(1 F (y1))]. From each of these consumers, rm j makes an
extra prot (2p   )   p = p   . Therefore, conditional on (y1; y2) the positive (rst-
order) e¤ect of introducing a small discount  is (p  )[f(y1)(1  F (y2)) + f(y2)(1 
F (y1))]. Integrating it over (y1; y2) and using the symmetry yields
2p
ZZ
f(y1)(1  F (y2))dF (y2)n 1dF (y1)n 1 = 2
n
p
Z
f(y1)dF (y1)
n 1 =
2
n2
:
(We have discarded the higher-order e¤ect 2. The rst equality used the fact thatR
(1 F (y2))dF (y2)n 1 = 1=n, and the second one used the denition of p in (1).) Thus,
the benet is twice the loss. As a result, the proposed deviation is indeed protable.40
40The spirit of this argument is similar to McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston, 1989, and Armstrong
and Vickers, 2010. The former deals with a monopoly model, and the latter deals with a duopoly
model.
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5.2 Equilibrium prices
We aim to characterize a symmetric mixed-bundling equilibrium (; ), where  is the
stand-alone price for each individual product and    is the joint-purchase discount.41
Suppose that all other rms use the equilibrium strategy and rm j unilaterally devi-
ates and sets prices (0; 0). Then a consumer has the following purchase options (for
convenience we suppress the superscripts in rm js match utilities):
(a) buy both products from rm j, in which case her surplus is x1 + x2  (20  0);
(b) buy product 1 from rm j but product 2 from elsewhere, in which case her
surplus is x1 + y2   0   ;
(c) buy product 2 from rm j but product 1 from elsewhere, in which case her
surplus is y1 + x2   0   ;
(d) buy both products from some other rms, in which case her surplus is A (2 )
(where A will be dened below).
When the consumer buys only one product, say, product i, from some other rm,
she will buy the best one with match utility yi. When she buys both products from
some other rms (and n  3), there are two cases to consider: If y1 and y2 are from
the same rm, the decision is simple and the consumer will buy both products from
that rm, in which case A = y1 + y2. This occurs with probability 1n 1 . With the
remaining probability n 2
n 1 , y1 and y2 are from di¤erent rms. Then the consumer faces
the trade-o¤ between consuming better-matched products by two-stop shopping and
enjoying the joint-purchase discount by one-stop shopping. In the former case, she has
surplus y1 + y2   2, and in the latter case she has surplus z   (2  ), where
z  max
k 6=j
fxk1 + xk2g < y1 + y2 (18)
is the match utility of the best bundle among all other rms. Hence, when y1 and y2
are from di¤erent rms, A = maxfz; y1 + y2   g. In sum, we have
A =
(
y1 + y2 with prob. 1n 1
maxfz; y1 + y2   g with prob. n 2n 1
: (19)
The relatively simple case is when n = 2. Then A = y1+y2, and the surplus from the
fourth option above is simply y1+y2 (2 ). The problem can then be converted into
a two-dimensional Hotelling model by using two location random variables x1   y1
and x2   y2. That is the model often used in the existing literature on competitive
mixed bundling.
When n  3, the situation is more involved. We need to deal with one more random
variable z dened in (18), and moreover z is correlated with y1 and y2 as reported in
41If  > , the bundle would be cheaper than each individual product, and so only the bundle price
would matter for consumer choices. The situation would then be like pure bundling where consumers
can buy multiple bundles. Of course, if the bundle price is high enough (e.g., due to high production
costs), consumers will not have an incentive to buy multiple bundles.
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the following lemma. Characterizing this correlation is an important step in solving the
mixed bundling pricing game with more than two rms. Given the following result, the
distribution of A conditional on y1 and y2 is fully characterized.
Lemma 5 When n  3, the CDF of z dened in (18), conditional on y1, y2, and they
being from di¤erent rms, is
L(z) =
F (z   y1)F (z   y2)
(F (y1)F (y2))
n 2

F (y2)F (z   y2) +
Z y1
z y2
F (z   x)dF (x)
n 3
(20)
for z 2 [maxfy1; y2g+ x; y1 + y2).
Proof. For a given consumer, let I(yi), i = 1; 2, be the identity of the rm that
generates yi. The lower bound of z is because the lowest possible match utility of
the bundle from rm I(yi) is yi + x. We now calculate the conditional probability of
maxk 6=jfxk1 +xk2g < t. This event occurs if and only if all the following three conditions
are satised: (i) y1 + x
I(y1)
2 < t, (ii) x
I(y2)
1 + y2 < t, and (iii) x
k
1 + x
k
2 < t for all
k 6= j; I(y1); I(y2). Given y1 and y2, condition (i) holds with probability F (t y1)=F (y2),
since the CDF of xI(y1)2 conditional on x
I(y1)
2 < y2 is F (x)=F (y2). Similarly, condition
(ii) holds with probability F (t   y2)=F (y1). One can also check (with the help of a
graph) that the probability that xk1 + x
k
2 < t holds for one rm other than j, I(y1) and
I(y2), is
1
F (y1)F (y2)

F (y2)F (t  y2) +
Z y1
t y2
F (t  x)dF (x)

:
Conditional on y1 and y2, these three events are independent of each other. Therefore,
the conditional probability of maxk 6=jfxk1 + xk2g < t is the right-hand side of (20).
Given a realization of (y1; y2; A), the following graph describes how a consumer
chooses among the above four purchase options:
x1
x2
@
@
@
@@
y1 + 
0     0
A  y2 + 0   + 
y2 + 
0     0
A  y1 + 0   + 

b

2

1
buy both from
other rms
Figure 6: The pattern of consumer choice
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As before, 
i, i = 1; 2, indicates the region where the consumer buys only product i
from rm j, and 
b indicates the region where the consumer buys both products from
rm j. Then integrating the area of 
i over (y1; y2; A) yields the demand function
for rm js single product i, and integrating the area of 
b over (y1; y2; A) yields the
demand function for rm js bundle.
From Figure 6, we can see that the equilibrium demand for rm js single product
i is

i()  E [F (yj   )(1  F (A  yj + ))] , i = 1; 2; j 6= i : (21)
(The expectation is taken over (y1; y2; A).) Given full market coverage, the equilibrium
demand depends only on the joint-purchase  but not on the stand-alone price . Let

b() be the equilibrium demand for rm js bundle. Then

i() + 
b() =
1
n
: (22)
With full market coverage, all consumers buy product i. Since all rms are ex ante
symmetric, the demand for each rms product i (either from single product purchase
or from bundle purchase) must be equal to 1=n. This also implies that 
1() = 
2().
To characterize the equilibrium prices, it is useful to introduce a few more pieces of
notation:
()  E [f(y1   ) (1  F (A  y1 + ))] ;
()  E [f(A  y1 + )F (y1   )] ; (23)
()  E[
Z A y2+
y1 
f(A  x)f(x)dx] :
(All the expectations are taken over (y1; y2; A).) Then the necessary conditions for 
and  to be the equilibrium prices are given in the following result. (See the online
appendix for the proof.)
Proposition 6 If a symmetric (pure strategy) mixed-bundling equilibrium exists, the
stand-alone price  and the joint-purchase discount  must satisfy
 =
1=n+ (() + ())
() + () + 2()
; (24)
and
 (()  ()) = 
1()  () : (25)
Notice that substituting (24) into (25) yields an equation of . Once  is solved, 
can be calculated from (24).
Discussion: equilibrium existence. To prove the existence of a symmetric (pure-
strategy) equilibrium,42 we need to show that (i) the system of necessary conditions
42In our model, each rms pricing strategy space is a subset of R3 and we can make it compact
without loss of generality. The prot function is continuous in prices as long as the density functions are.
Then Theorem 1 in Becker and Damianov (2006) implies that our model has a symmetric equilibrium
(but not necessarily in pure strategy).
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(24) and (25) has a solution with  < , and (ii) the necessary conditions are also
su¢ cient for dening the equilibrium prices. Unfortunately, both issues are hard to
investigate in general. For the rst one, we can show it when n = 2 or when n is
su¢ ciently large under the log-concavity condition. For the second one, no analytical
progress has been made. This issue is hard even in the duopoly case and is generally
an unsolved problem in the literature on mixed bundling. Numerically we can show the
existence in the uniform distribution and the normal distribution example.
In general, (), (), (), and 
1() in (24) and (25) have complicated expressions.
However, they are simple in the duopoly case, and they also have simple approximations
when  is small (which can be shown to be true under mild conditions when the number
of rms is large). Hence, in the following we study these two cases.
For convenience, let H() be the CDF of xi   yi. Then
H(t) =
Z x
x
F (x+ t)dF (x)n 1 and h(t) =
Z x
x
f(x+ t)dF (x)n 1 :
In particular, when n = 2, h(t) is symmetric around zero, and so h( t) = h(t) and
H( t) = 1 H(t). One can also check that for any n  2, H(0) = 1  1
n
. Notice that
h(0) is the density of marginal consumers for each rm in the regime of separate sales.
So the price p in (1) can be written as
p =
1
nh(0)
:
In the duopoly case, A = y1 + y2 and by using the symmetry of h one can check
that () = () = h()[1 H()] and 
1() = [1 H()]2. Thus, (25) simplies to
 =
1 H()
h()
: (26)
(Alternatively, it can be written as 
1() + 12

0
1() = 0 as in Armstrong and Vickers,
2010.) If 1 H is log-concave (which is implied by the log-concavity of f), this equation
has a unique positive solution. Meanwhile, (24) becomes
 =

2
+
1
4(() + ())
(27)
with () = 2
R 
0
h(t)2dt. In the uniform distribution example, one can check that
 = 1=3,   0:572 and the bundle price is 2    0:811. In the normal distribution
example, one can check that   1:063,   1:846 and the bundle price is 2   2:629.
In both examples, compared to the regime of separate sales, each single product becomes
more expensive but the bundle becomes cheaper.
When n is large, under mild conditions we can show that the system of (24) and
(25) has a solution with  close to zero. For a small  both sides of (25) have sim-
ple approximations, and an approximated  can be solved. The following proposition
provides the details. (See the online appendix for the proof.)
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Proposition 7 Suppose f is log-concave.
(i) When n = 2, the system of (26) and (27) has a solution with  < , and the bundle
price is lower than in the regime of separate sales (i.e., 2   < 2p).
(ii) Suppose jf
0(x)j
f(x)
is bounded and limn!1 p = 0, where p = 1nh(0) is the separate-sales
price in (1). When n is large, the system of (24) and (25) has a solution with  2 (0; p)
and it can be approximated as
  p;   p
2
:
Both the stand-alone price and the bundle price are lower than in the regime of separate
sales.
Result (ii) says that when n is large, the stand-alone price is approximately equal to
the price in the regime of separate sales and the joint-purchase discount is approximately
half of the stand-alone price. The mixed bundling price scheme can then be interpreted
as 50% o¤ for the second product.43 Result (ii) also implies that when there are many
rms in the market, mixed bundling tends to be pro-competitive relative to separate
sales.
5.3 Impact of mixed bundling
Given the assumption of full market coverage, total welfare is determined by the match
quality between consumers and products. Since the joint-purchase discount induces
consumers to one-stop shop too often, mixed bundling must lower total welfare relative
to separate sales. In the following, we discuss the impacts of mixed bundling on industry
prot and consumer surplus.
Let (; ) be the equilibrium industry prot. Then
(; ) = 2  n
b() :
Every consumer buys both products, but those who buy both from the same rm pay
 less. Thus, relative to separate sales the impact of mixed bundling on industry prot
is
(; )  (p; 0) = 2(  p)  n
b() : (28)
Let v(~; ~) be the consumer surplus when the stand-alone price is ~ and the joint-
purchase discount is ~. Given full market coverage, an envelope argument implies that
v1(~; ~) =  2 and v2(~; ~) = n
b(~), where the subscripts indicate partial derivatives.
(This is because raising ~ by " will make every consumer pay 2" more, and raising
the discount ~ by " will save " for every consumer who buy both products from the
43When there is a positive production cost c for each product, we have   (p   c)=2, i.e., the
bundling discount is approximately equal to half of the single products markup.
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same rm.) Then relative to separate sales, the impact of mixed bundling on consumer
surplus is
v(; )  v(p; 0) = v(; )  v(p; ) + v(p; )  v(p; 0)
=
Z 
p
v1(~; )d~+
Z 
0
v2(p; ~)d~
=  2(  p) + n
Z 
0

b(~)d~ : (29)
Hence, (28) and (29) provide the formulas for calculating the impacts of mixed bundling
on industry prot and consumer surplus. (From these two formulas, it is also clear that
mixed bundling harms total welfare given that 
b(~) is increasing in ~.)
In the duopoly case, Armstrong and Vickers (2010) have derived a su¢ cient con-
dition under which mixed bundling benets consumers and harms rms. With our
notation, the condition is d
dt
H(t)
h(t)
 1
4
for t  0. In the case with a large number of rms,
as long as our approximation results in Proposition 7 hold, this must be the case.
6 Conclusion
This paper has o¤ered a framework to study competitive bundling with an arbitrary
number of rms. In the pure bundling part, we found that the number of rms quali-
tatively matters for the impact of pure bundling relative to separate sales. Under fairly
general conditions, the impacts of pure bundling on prices, prots, and consumer sur-
plus are reversed when the number of rms exceeds some threshold (and the threshold
can be small). This suggests that the welfare assessment of pure bundling based on
a duopoly model can be misleading. In the mixed bundling part, we found that solv-
ing the pricing equilibrium with mixed bundling is signicantly more challenging when
there are more than two rms. We have proposed a method to characterize the equi-
librium prices, and we have also shown that they have simple approximations when the
number of rms is large. Based on the approximations, we argue that mixed bundling
is generally pro-competitive when the number of rms is large.
One assumption in the pure bundling part is that consumers do not buy more than
one bundle. This is without loss of generality if production cost is high or if bundling
is caused by product incompatibility or high shopping costs. However if production
cost is relatively small and bundling is a pricing strategy, then it is possible that the
bundle price is low enough such that some consumers want to buy multiple bundles
to mix and match. Buying multiple bundles is not uncommon, for instance, in the
markets for textbooks or newspapers. With the possibility of buying multiple bundles,
the situation is actually similar to mixed bundling. For example, consider the case
with two products. When the bundle price is P , a consumer faces two options: buy
the best single bundle and pay P , or buy two bundles to mix and match and pay 2P
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(suppose the unused products can be disposed freely). For consumers, this is the same
as in a regime of mixed bundling with a stand-alone price P for each product and a
joint-purchase discount P . Our method of solving the mixed bundling game can be
used to deal with this case.
In the mixed bundling part, we have focused on the case with only two products.
When the number of products increases, the pricing strategy space becomes more in-
volved, and we have not found a relatively transparent way to solve the model. One
possible way to proceed is to consider simple pricing policies such as two-part tari¤s.
Finally, there are some recent empirical works on bundling. See, e.g., Crawford
and Yurukoglu (2012) for bundling in the cable TV industry and Ho, Ho, and Mor-
timer (2012) for bundling in the video rental industry. These works focus on how the
interaction between bundling and the vertical market structure might a¤ect market
performance. This is an interesting aspect ignored by the existing theoretical literature
on bundling and deserves more exploration.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: (i) The duopoly model can be converted into a two-
dimensional Hotelling model. Dene di  x1i   x2i , and let H and h be its CDF and
density function, respectively. Since x1i and x
2
i are i.i.d., di has a support [x  x; x  x]
and is symmetric around zero. One can check that h(0) =
R
f(x)2dx. Then in the
duopoly case the equilibrium price in (1) can be written as
p =
1
2h(0)
:
Notice that h is log-concave given f is log-concave.
Let H and h be the CDF and density function of
Pm
i=1 di=m. One can check that
h(0) =
R
g(x)2dx. Then the per-product bundle price can be written as
P
m
=
1
2h(0)
:
Given that di has a symmetric and log-concave density,
Pm
i=1 di=m is more peaked than
di in the sense Pr(j
Pm
i=1 di=mj  t)  Pr(jdij  t) for any t 2 [0; x  x]. (See Theorem
2.3 in Proschan, 1965.) This implies that h(0)  h(0) and so P=m  p.
(ii) Given f(x) > 0, we have f(x) > g(x) = 0, and so the result for n > n^ follows
immediately from result (ii) in Lemma 2. To prove the limit result, we use the technique
in the proof of Lemma 2 and notice that
lim
n!1
P=m
p
= lim
n!1
R 1
0
lF (t)dt
n 1R 1
0
lG(t)dtn 1
:
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Given lF (t) is bounded and lF (1) > 0, the numerator converges to lF (1) > 0. While the
denominator converges to zero since lG(t) is bounded and lG(1) = 0. Then limn!1
P=m
p
=
1.
To prove the cut-o¤ result, dene
(n) 
Z 1
0
[lF (t)  lG(t)]tn 2dt : (30)
Under our conditions, we already know that (2) < 0 and (n) > 0 for a su¢ ciently
large n. In the following, we show that (n) changes its sign only once if lF (t) and lG(t)
cross each other at most twice.
We use one version of the Variation Diminishing Theorem (see Theorem 3.1 in
Karlin, 1968).44 Let us rst introduce two concepts. A real function K(x; y) of two
variables is said to be totally positive of order r if for all x1 <    < xk and y1 <    < yk
with 1  k  r, we have 
K(x1; y1)    K(x1; yk)
...
...
K(xk; y1)    K(xk; yk)
  0 :
We also need a way to count the number of sign changes of a function. Consider a
function f(t) for t 2 T where T is an ordered set of the real line. Let
S(f)  supS[f(t1);    ; f(tk)] ;
where the supremum is extended over all sets t1      tk (ti 2 T ), k is arbitrary but
nite, and S(x1;    ; xk) is the number of sign changes of the indicated sequence, zero
terms being discarded.
Theorem 1 (Karlin,1968) Consider the following transformation
(x) =
Z
Y
K(x; y)f(y)d(y) ;
where K(x; y) is a two-dimensional Borel-measurable function and  is a sigma-nite
regular measure dened on Y . Suppose f is Borel-measurable and bounded, and the
integral exists. Then if K is totally positive of order r and S(f)  r   1, then
S()  S(f) :
44Chakraborty (1999) uses this same theorem in proving a cut-o¤ result on how bundling a¤ects a
sellers revenue in multiproduct auctions. See section 4.6 for a detailed discussion about the di¤erence
between auctions and our price competition model. The main technical di¤erence here, compared to
the proof in Chakraborty (1999), is our Lemma 6 below.
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Now consider (n) dened in (30). Our assumption implies that S[lf (t)  lg(t)]  2.
The lemma below proves that K(t; n) = tn 2 is totally positive of order 3. Therefore,
the above theorem implies that S()  2. That is, (n) changes its sign at most twice
as n varies. Given (2) < 0 and (n) > 0 for a su¢ ciently large n, it is impossible that
(n) changes its sign exactly twice. Therefore, it must change its sign only once and so
there exists n^ such that (n) < 0 if and only if n  n^.
Lemma 6 Let t 2 (0; 1) and n  2 be integers. Then tn 2 is strictly totally positive of
order 3.
Proof. We need to show that for all 0 < t1 < t2 < t3 < 1 and 2  n1 < n2 < n3,
we have
tn1 21 > 0,
 tn1 21 tn2 21tn1 22 tn2 22
 > 0, and

tn1 21 t
n2 2
1 t
n3 2
1
tn1 22 t
n2 2
2 t
n3 2
2
tn1 23 t
n2 2
3 t
n3 2
3
 > 0 :
The rst two inequalities are easy to check. The third one is equivalent to
tn11 t
n2
1 t
n3
1
tn12 t
n2
2 t
n3
2
tn13 t
n2
3 t
n3
3
 > 0 :
Dividing the ith row by t
n1
i (i = 1; 2; 3) and then dividing the second column by t
n2 n1
1
and the third column by tn3 n11 , we can see that the determinant has the same sign as
1 1 1
1 r22 r
3
2
1 r23 r
3
3
 = (r22   1)(r33   1)  (r32   1)(r23   1) ;
where j  nj   n1 and rj  tj=t1, j = 2; 3. Notice that 0 < 2 < 3 and 1 < r2 < r3.
To show that the above expression is positive, it su¢ ces to show that xy   1 is log-
supermodular for x > 1 and y > 0. One can check that @
2
@x@y
log(xy   1) has the same
sign as xy   1   log xy > 0. (The inequality is because xy > 1 and log z < z   1 for
z 6= 1.)
(iii) Suppose xji has a mean  and variance 
2. When m is large, by the central
limit theorem,Xj=m is distributed (approximately) according to the normal distribution
N (; 2=m). Then (8) implies that
Pp
m
 pN ;
where pN is the separate sales price when x
j
i follows a normal distribution N (; 2).
Then it is clear that P=m decreases in m and converges to zero as m!1.
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Proof of Proposition 2: (i): The rst condition simply follows from result (ii) in
Proposition 1. To prove the second condition, we use two results in Gabaix et al. (2015).
From their Theorem 1 and Proposition 2, we know that when limx!x ddx(
1 F (x)
f(x)
) = 0,
the equilibrium price (1) in the Perlo¤-Salop model has the same approximation as
E[x(n) x(n 1)] when n is large, where x(n) and x(n 1) are the rst and the second order
statistic of a sequence of i.i.d. random variables fx1;    ; xng. In other words,
p  E x(n)   x(n 1)
as n!1.45 Then the per-product consumer surplus in the regime of separate sales is
E

x(n)
  p  E x(n 1) :
Since limx!x ddx(
1 F (x)
f(x)
) = 0 implies limx!x ddx(
1 G(x)
g(x)
) = 0, we can deduce that when n
is large the per-product consumer surplus in the regime of pure bundling is
E

X(n)
m

  P
m
 E

X(n 1)
m

:
When n is large, it is clear that E
h
X(n 1)
m
i
< E

x(n 1)

and so our result follows.
(ii): It su¢ ces to show the threshold n exists when m!1 . As we have explained
in the main text, when m!1 bundling benets consumers if and only if
E

max
j
fxjig

   < p : (31)
Since the left-hand side of (31) increases with n while the right-hand side decreases
with n, we only need to prove two things: (a) condition (31) holds for n = 2, and (b)
the opposite is true for a su¢ ciently large n.
Condition (b) is relatively easy to show. The left-hand side of (31) approaches
x   = R x
x
F (x)dx as n!1. So we need
lim
n!1
p =
1  F (x)
f(x)
<
Z x
x
F (x)dx ; (32)
where the equality is from (3). If limn!1 p = 0 (e.g., if f(x) > 0), this is clearly the
case. But we want to show this is true even if limn!1 p > 0. Notice that log-concave
f implies log-concave 1  F (or decreasing (1  F )=f). ThenZ x
x
F (x)dx =
Z x
x
1  F (x)
f(x)
F (x)
1  F (x)dF (x)
>
1  F (x)
f(x)
Z x
x
F (x)
1  F (x)dF (x)
=
1  F (x)
f(x)
Z 1
0
t
1  tdt :
45This result implies that when the tail behavior condition holds, the Perlo¤-Salop price competition
model is asymptotically equivalent to an auction model where rms bid for a consumer whose valuations
for each product are publicly known. However, when the tail behavior condition does not hold or when
n is not large enough, this equivalence result does not hold.
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Since the integral term is innity, condition (32) must hold.
We now prove condition (a). Using (1) and the notation l(t)  f(F 1(t)), we can
rewrite (31) as Z 1
0
t  tn
l(t)
dt
Z 1
0
tn 2l(t)dt <
1
n(n  1) :
When n = 2, this becomes Z 1
0
t(1  t)
l(t)
dt
Z 1
0
l(t)dt <
1
2
: (33)
To prove this inequality, we need the following technical result:46
Lemma 7 Suppose ' : [0; 1]! R is a nonnegative function such that R 1
0
'(t)
t(1 t)dt <1,
and r : [0; 1]! R is a concave density function. ThenZ 1
0
'(t)
r(t)
dt  max
Z 1
0
'(t)
2t
dt;
Z 1
0
'(t)
2(1  t)dt

:
Proof. Since r is a concave density function, it is a mixture of triangular distribu-
tions and admits a representation of the form
r(t) =
Z 1
0
r(t)()d ;
where () is a density function dened on [0; 1], r1(t) = 2t, r0(t) = 2(1   t), and for
0 <  < 1
r(t) =
8>>><>>>:
2
t

if 0  t < 
2
1  t
1   if   t  1
:
(See, for instance, Example 5 in Csiszár and Móri, 2004.)
By Jensens Inequality we have
1
r(t)
=
1R 1
0
r(t)()d

Z 1
0
1
r(t)
()d :
ThenZ 1
0
'(t)
r(t)
dt 
Z 1
0
'(t)
Z 1
0
1
r(t)
()d

dt =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
'(t)
r(t)
dt

()d  sup
11
Z 1
0
'(t)
r(t)
dt :
Notice that Z 1
0
'(t)
r(t)
dt =

2
Z 
0
'(t)
t
dt+
1  
2
Z 1

'(t)
1  tdt :
This is a convex function of , because its derivative
1
2
Z 
0
'(t)
t
dt  1
2
Z 1

'(t)
1  tdt
46I am grateful to Tomás F. Móri in Budapest for helping me to prove this lemma.
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increases in . Hence, its maximum is attained at one of the endpoints of the domain
[0; 1]. This completes the proof of the lemma.
Now let '(t) = t(1  t) and
r(t) =
l(t)R 1
0
l(t)dt
:
Notice that l(t) is concave when f is log-concave. So the dened r(t) is indeed a concave
density function. (The integral in the denominator is nite since l(t) is nonnegative and
concave.) Then Lemma 7 implies that the left-hand side of (33) is no greater than 1=4.
Consumer surplus comparison with normal distribution. To prove (12), it
su¢ ces to establish the following result:
Lemma 8 Consider a sequence of i.i.d. random variables fxjgnj=1 with xj s N (0; 2).
Let p be the separate sales price as dened in (1) when rm js product has match utility
xj. Then
E

max
j

xj
	
=
2
p
:
Proof. Let F () be the CDF of xj. Then the CDF of maxj fxjg is F ()n, and so
E

max
j

xj
	
=
Z 1
 1
xdF (x)n = n
Z 1
 1
xF (x)n 1f(x)dx :
For a normal distribution with zero mean, we have f 0(x) =  xf(x)=2. Therefore,
E

max
j

xj
	
=  2n
Z 1
 1
F (x)n 1f 0(x)dx
= 2n(n  1)
Z 1
 1
F (x)n 2f(x)2dx
=
2
p
:
(The second step is from integration by parts, and the last step used (1).)
Proof of Proposition 3: (i) The result that bundling is always a NE has been ex-
plained in the main text. We now prove the uniqueness in the duopoly case. We
rst show that it is not an equilibrium that both rms sell their products separately.
Consider a hypothetical separate sales equilibrium with price p. Suppose now rm j
unilaterally bundles. Then the situation is like both rms are bundling, and rm j can
at least earn the same prot as before by setting a bundle price mp. It can actually
do strictly better by adjusting its prices as well. Suppose rm j sets a bundle price
mp m", where " > 0 is small. The negative (rst-order) e¤ect of this deviation on rm
js prots is m
2
". This is because half of the consumers buy from rm j when " = 0,
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and now they pay m" less. On the other hand, the deviation increases the demand for
rm js bundle to
Pr(Xj +m" > Xk) =
Z
G(x+ ")dG(x) :
So the demand increases by "
R
g(x)2dx, and the positive (rst-order) e¤ect of the
deviation on rm js prot is
mp "
Z
g(x)2dx =
mp
P
 m
2
" :
(The equality used (5) at n = 2.) Therefore, the deviation is protable if P < mp.
Similarly, if P > mp, then charging a bundle pricemp+m" will be a protable deviation.
Second, we show that there are no asymmetric equilibria either. Consider a hypo-
thetical equilibrium where rm j bundles and rm k does not. For consumers, this is
like both rms are bundling. As a result, in equilibrium rm j o¤ers a bundle price
P dened in (5) with n = 2, and rm k o¤ers individual prices fpigmi=1 such thatPm
i=1 pi = P . Suppose now rm j unbundles. It can at least earn the same prot as
before by charging the same prices as rm k. But it can do strictly better by o¤ering
prices fpi   "gmi=1, where " > 0 is small. The negative (rst-order) e¤ect of this devia-
tion on rm js prot is m
2
". On the other hand, the demand for rm js each product
increases by "
R
f(x)2dx, and so the positive (rst-order) e¤ect is
mX
i=1
pi  "
Z
f(x)2dx =
P
mp
 m
2
" :
(The equality used (1) at n = 2 and
Pm
i=1 pi = P .) Therefore, the deviation is protable
if P > mp. Similarly, if P < mp, setting prices fpi+"gmi=1 will be a protable deviation.
(ii) It su¢ ces to show the threshold ~n exists when m!1 . As we have explained
in the main text, when m!1 a rm has no unilateral incentive to bundle if and only
if
(1  1
n
)p <
Z 
F (x)  F (x)n 1 dx : (34)
We have known that (34) fails to hold for n = 2. On the other hand, we have limn!1 p <R x
x
F (x)dx as shown in the proof of Proposition 2. Then (34) must hold when n is
su¢ ciently large. In the following, we further show a cut-o¤ result. Using the notation
l(t)  f(F 1(t)), we rewrite (34) as
(n)  (1  1
n
)p 
Z 1
0
t  tn 1
l(t)
dt < 0 :
It su¢ ces to show that (n) decreases in n. This is not obvious given 1  1
n
is increasing
in n.
Let pn denote the separate sales price when there are n rms. Then we have
(n+ 1) (n) = pn+1 n
n+ 1
  pnn  1
n
 
Z 1
0
tn 1(1  t)
l(t)
dt :
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On one hand, from Lemma 1 we know that pn+1 < pn when f is log-concave. So
pn+1
n
n+ 1
  pnn  1
n
<
pn
n(n+ 1)
=
1
n2(n2   1) R 1
0
l(t)tn 2dt
:
(The equality used 1
pn
= n(n  1) R 1
0
l(t)tn 2dt.) On the other hand, we haveZ 1
0
tn 1(1  t)
l(t)
dt =
1
n(n+ 1)
Z 1
0
(t)
l(t)
dt >
1
n(n+ 1)
R 1
0
l(t)(t)dt
;
where (t)  n(n + 1)tn 1(1   t) is a density function on [0; 1], and the inequality is
from Jensens Inequality.
Therefore, (n+ 1) (n) < 0 if
n(n+ 1)
Z 1
0
l(t)(t)dt < n2(n2   1)
Z 1
0
l(t)tn 2dt
, (n+ 1)2
Z 1
0
l(t)tn 1(1  t)dt < (n2   1)
Z 1
0
l(t)tn 2dt :
Since t(1  t)  1
4
for t 2 [0; 1], this condition holds if (n+1)2
4
< n2  1, which is true for
any n  2.
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Online Appendix
[Not For Publication]
This online appendix contains a few proofs and the details of some discussions
omitted in the paper.
The duopoly case with asymmetric products and correlated valuations. Con-
sider the duopoly case with a general joint distribution as introduced in Section 4.5.1.
Following the logic in the proof of result (i) in Proposition 1, let hi be the density func-
tion of x1i   x2i . (Notice that x1i   x2i is symmetric around zero, and hi is log-concave
if fi is log-concave.) Then the separate sales price for product i is pi = 12hi(0) . Let
h be the density function of 1
m
Pm
i=1(x
1
i   x2i ). Then the per-product bundle price is
P=m = 1
2h(0)
, and so P <
Pm
i=1 pi if and only if
1
h(0)
<
1
m
mX
i=1
1
hi(0)
: (35)
Jensens Inequality implies that the right-hand side is greater than
 
1
m
Pm
i=1 hi(0)
 1
.
Therefore, a su¢ cient condition for P <
Pm
i=1 pi is
1
m
mX
i=1
hi(0)  h(0) : (36)
It appears hard to nd simple primitive conditions on the joint density function f such
that (35) or (36) is satised.1
The following example shows that in the duopoly case bundling can lower market
price even if products are substantially asymmetric. Consider a two-product example
where xj1 is uniformly distributed on [0; 1] and x
j
2 is independent of x
j
1 and is uniformly
distributed on [0; b] with b > 1. In duopoly, x11   x21 and x12   x22 have density functions
h1(x) =
(
1 + x if x 2 [ 1; 0]
1  x if x 2 [0; 1] and h2(x) =
(
1
b
(1 + x
b
) if x 2 [ b; 0]
1
b
(1  x
b
) if x 2 [0; b] ;
respectively. Then h1(0) = 1 and h2(0) = 1b . One can also check
h(0) = 2(3b 1)
3b2
. The
su¢ cient condition (36) holds only for b less than about 2:46, but the i¤condition (35)
holds for any b > 1. Hence, bundling lowers prices in this duopoly example. However,
according to Proposition 4 bundling raises prices in this example if n is su¢ ciently
large.
1If the m products are symmetric and the joint density function of fx1i  x2i gmi=1 is Schur-concave, or
if the m products at each rm have independent match utilities and any two random variables x1i  x2i
and x1k   x2k can be ranked according to the likelihood ratio order, then there are extensions of the
Proschan (1956) result which can help prove (36). But we do not have simple primitive conditions for
either of the conditions to hold. (In the symmetric and independent case, both conditions are satised
if f is log-concave.)
1
Proof of Lemma 4: We only prove the results for p. (The same logic works for P .)
Notice that 1 F is log-concave given f is log-concave. When p = 0, it is clear that the
left-hand side of (16) is less than the right-hand side. We can also show the opposite
is true when p = pM . By using the second order statistic as in the proof of Lemma 1,
the right-hand side of (16) equals
1  F (p)n
nF (p)n 1f(p) +
R x
p
f(x)
1 F (x)dF(2)(x)
<
1  F (p)n
nF (p)n 1f(p) + f(p)
1 F (p)(1  F(2)(p))
=
1  F (p)
f(p)
:
(The inequality is because f=(1   F ) is increasing, and the equality used F(2)(p) =
F (p)n + nF (p)n 1(1  F (p)).) This, together with the fact that pM = 1 F (pM )f(pM ) , implies
that (16) has a solution p 2 (0; pM).
To show the uniqueness, we prove that the right-hand side of (16) decreases with p.
One can verify that its derivative with respect to p is negative if and only if
f 0(p)(1  F (p)n) + nf(p)

F (p)n 1f(p) +
Z x
p
f(x)dF (x)n 1

> 0 :
Using (1   F )f 0 + f 2 > 0 (which is implied by the log-concavity of 1   F ), one can
check that the above inequality holds if
n
Z x
p
f(x)dF (x)n 1 > (1  F (p)n) f(p)
1  F (p)   nf(p)F (p)
n 1 :
The left-hand side equals
R x
p
f(x)
1 F (x)dF(2)(x), and the right-hand side equals
f(p)
1 F (p)(1  
F(2)(p)). Therefore, the inequality is implied by the increasing f=(1  F ).
To prove the result that p decreases in n, let us rst rewrite (16) as
1
p
=
f(x)  R x
p
f 0(x)F (x)n 1dx
(1  F (p)n)=n =
nf(x)
1  F (p)n  
Z x
p
f 0(x)
f(x)
d
F (x)n   F (p)n
1  F (p)n : (37)
(The rst step is from integration by parts.) First of all, one can show that n
1 F (p)n
increases with n. Second, the log-concavity of f implies that  f 0
f
is increasing. Third,
notice that F (x)
n F (p)n
1 F (p)n is CDF of the highest order statistic of fxigni=1 conditional on
it being greater than p, and so it increases in n in the sense of rst-order stochastic
dominance. These three observations imply that the right-hand side of (37) increases
with n. Therefore, the unique solution p must decrease with n.
Elastic consumer demand. We extend the baseline model by considering elastic
consumer demand. Suppose each product is divisible and consumers can buy any
quantity of a product, and the m products are independent products. If a consumer
purchases  i units of product i from rm j, suppose that she obtains utility u( i) + x
j
i ,
where u( i) is the basic utility from consuming  i units of product i, and x
j
i is the
random utility component as before and reects product di¤erentiation. We also assume
2
that rms use a linear pricing scheme for each product. Then if a consumer chooses
to buy product i from rm j, she must buys all the units from it. Denote by (pi) 
max i u( i) pi i the indirect utility function when a consumer optimally buys product
i at unit price pi. Then (pi) is a decreasing function, and  0(pi) is the usual demand
function.
Consider the regime of separate sales rst. Let p be the (symmetric) equilibrium
unit price. Suppose rm j unilaterally deviates and charges p0. Then the probability
that a consumer will buy product i from rm j is
q(p0) = Pr[(p0) + xji > max
k 6=j
f(p) + xki g] :
Firm js prot from product i is then  0(p0)p0q(p0).
It turns out to be more convenient to work on indirect utility directly. We then
look for a symmetric equilibrium where each rm o¤ers indirect utility s. Given (p)
is monotonic in p, there is a one-to-one correspondence between p and s. When a rm
o¤ers indirect utility s, it must be charging a price p =  1(s) and the optimal quantity
a consumer will buy is  0( 1(s)). Denote by r(s)   1(s)( 0( 1(s))) the per-
consumer prot when a rm o¤ers indirect utility s. If rm j unilaterally deviates and
o¤ers s0, the number of consumers who choose to buy from it is
q(s0) = Pr[s0 + xji > max
k 6=j
fs+ xki g] =
Z
[1  F (x+ s  s0)]dF (x)n 1 :
Then rm js prot from its product i is r(s0)q(s0). The rst-order condition for s to
be the equilibrium indirect utility is
 r
0(s)
r(s)
= n
Z
f(x)dF (x)n 1 : (38)
If both r(s) and f(x) are log-concave, this is also su¢ cient for dening the equilibrium
indirect utility. This equation has a unique solution if r(s) is log-concave (so   r0(s)
r(s)
is
increasing in s).2
Now consider the regime of pure bundling. If a rm adopts a pure bundling strategy,
it requires a consumer to buy all products from it or nothing at all. But unlike in the
baseline model, now a rms pricing strategy can no longer be represented by a simple
bundle price, and it has to specify a vector of prices (p1;    ; pm). (In the baseline
model with unit demand, o¤ering a bundle price is equivalent to o¤ering a vector of
single-product prices in the bundling regime.) If a consumer buys all products from
this rm, her indirect utility is
Pm
i=1 (pi). Suppose a rm o¤ers an indirect utility
S. Then the optimal price vector should solve the problem maxfpig
Pm
i=1 pi( 0(pi))
subject to
Pm
i=1 (pi) = S. Let us suppose this problem has a unique solution with
2In the case with a linear demand function  0(p) = 1   p, one can check that r(s) = p2s   2s
(which is concave) and   r0(s)r(s) increases from  1 to 1 when s varies from 0 to 12 .
3
pi = pk. The optimal unit price for each product is then  1( Sm). Once we work on the
indirect utility, it is similar as before that in the regime of separate sales a rm o¤ers an
indirect utility for each product, and in the regime of pure bundling it o¤ers a bundle
indirect utility.
We look for a symmetric equilibrium where each rm o¤ers an indirect utility S.
Suppose rm j unilaterally deviates to S 0. Then the number of consumers who buy all
products from rm j is
Q(S 0) = Pr[S 0 +Xj > max
k 6=j
fS +Xkg] = Pr[S
0
m
+
Xj
m
> max
k 6=j
f S
m
+
Xk
m
g] :
Firm js prot is mr(S
0
m
)Q(S 0), and then the rst-order condition is
 r
0( S
m
)
r( S
m
)
= n
Z
g(x)dG(x)n 1 : (39)
Therefore, as long as   r0(s)
r(s)
is increasing in s (or r(s) is log-concave), (38) and (39)
are similar as the equilibrium price conditions (1) and (5) in the baseline model with
unit demand. Then our price comparison results in Proposition 1 continues to hold.
Proof of Proposition 6: To derive the equilibrium conditions for  and , let us
consider the following two local deviations:
First, suppose rm j raises its joint-purchase discount to 0 =  + " while keeps
its stand-alone price unchanged. Then conditional on (y1; y2; A), Figure 7(a) below
describes how this small deviation a¤ects consumer choices: 
b expands because now
more consumers buy both products from rm j. The marginal consumers are distributed
on the shaded area.
x1
x2
@
@
@
@@
y1   
A  y2 + 
y2   
A  y1 + 

b

2

1
buy both from
other rms
pppppppppppppp
ppppppppppppppp
ppppppppppppppp pppppppppppppp
@
@
@
@
@
p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
p p p p p p p p p p p p p p
12
1
2
Figure 7(a): Price deviation and consumer choice I
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Here i, i = 1; 2, indicates the density of marginal consumers along the line segment
i on the graph, and it equals f(yi   )(1   F (A   yi + )). And 12 indicates the
density of marginal consumers along the diagonal line segment on the graph, and it
equals
R A y2+
y1  f(A  x)f(x)dx. Integrating them over (y1; y2; A) yields the previously
introduced notation: E[1] = E[2] = () and E[12] = (). For the marginal
consumers on the horizontal and the vertical shaded area (which have a measure of
"(1 + 2)), they now buy one more product from rm j and so rm j makes    
extra prot from each of them. For those marginal consumers on the diagonal shaded
area (which has a measure of "12), they switch from buying both products from some
other rms to buying both from rm j. So rm j makes 2   extra prot from each
of them. The only negative e¤ect of this deviation is that those consumers on 
b who
were already purchasing both products at rm j now pay " less. Integrating the sum
of all these e¤ects over (y1; y2; A) should be equal to zero in equilibrium. This yields
the following rst-order condition:
2(  )() + (2  )() = 
b() ; (40)
where () and () are dened in (23) and 
b() is dened in (22).
Second, suppose rm j raises its stand-along price to 0 = +" and its joint-purchase
discount to 0 =  + 2" (such that its bundle price remains unchanged). Figure 7(b)
below describes how this small deviation a¤ects consumer choices: both 
1 and 
2
shrink because now fewer consumers buy a single product from rm j.
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@
@
@@
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Figure 7(b): Price deviation and consumer choice II
Here, i, i = 1; 2, indicates the density of marginal consumers along the line segment
i on the graph, and it equals f(A  yi + )F (yi  ). Integrating them over (y1; y2; A)
yields the notation () introduced before: E[1] = E[2] = (). For those marginal
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consumers with a measure of "(1 + 2), they switch from buying only one product to
buying both from rm j. So rm j make     extra prot from each of them. For
those marginal consumers with a measure of "(1 + 2), they switch from buying one
product to buying nothing from rm j. So rm j loses  from each of them. The direct
revenue e¤ect of the deviation is that rm j earns " more from each consumer on 
1
and 
2 who were originally buying a single product from it. Integrating the sum of
these e¤ects over (y1; y2; A) should be equal to zero in equilibrium. This yields another
rst-order condition:
(  )() + 
1() = () ; (41)
where () and () are dened in (23) and 
1() is dened in (21), and we have used
the fact 
1() = 
2().
Both (40) and (41) are linear in . By using (22), it is straightforward to solve  as
in (24). Substituting it into (41) yields (25) which is an equation of .
Proof of Proposition 7:
(i) The duopoly case. The existence of solution has been shown in the main text.
To prove  < , notice that it is equivalent to
() + () = h()[1 H()] + 2
Z 
0
h(t)2dt <
1
2
: (42)
On one hand, Z 
0
h(t)2dt < h(0)[H()  1
2
] :
(This is because the log-concavity and symmetry of h(t) implies that h(t) is decreasing
in t > 0 and H(0) = 1
2
.) On the other hand, (26) and the log-concavity of h(t) imply
that
 =
1 H()
h()
<
1 H(0)
h(0)
=
1
2h(0)
:
Then a su¢ cient condition for (42) is
h()[1 H()] + h(0)[2H()  1] < h(0), h() < 2h(0) :
This is clearly true since h(t) is decreasing in t > 0.
To prove the bundle price comparison result, notice that the bundle price in the
duopoly case is 2    = 1=[2(() + ())], and the bundle price in the regime of
separate sales is 1=h(0). The former is lower if
() + () = h()[1 H()] + 2
Z 
0
h(t)2dt  h(0)
2
:
Notice that the equality holds at  = 0. So it su¢ ces to show that the left-hand side is
increasing in . Its derivative is h()2+ h0()[1 H()]. This is positive if h=(1 H) is
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increasing or equivalently if 1 H is log-concave. This is implied by the log-concavity
of f .
(ii) The case with large n. The proof consists of a few steps.
Step 1: Approximate (), (), () and 
1() when  is small.
Lemma 9 For a given n, if   0, we have
()  h(0)
n
 

h0(0)
n
+
h(0)2
n  1

 ;
() 

1  1
n

h(0) +

h0(0)
n
  h(0)2

 ; (43)
()  nh(0)
2
n  1  ;

1()  1
n

1  1
n

  2h(0)
n
 ;
where h(0) =
R
f(x)dF (x)n 1 and h0(0) =
R
f 0(x)dF (x)n 1.3
Proof. Werst explain how to calculate E[ (y1; y2; A)] for a given function  (y1; y2; A),
where the expectation is taken over (y1; y2; A). Using (19), we have
E[ (y1; y2; A)] =
1
n  1Ey1;y2 [ (y1; y2; y1 + y2)]
+
n  2
n  1Ey1;y2 [L(y1 + y2   ) (y1; y2; y1 + y2   ) +
Z y1+y2
y1+y2 
 (y1; y2; z)dL(z)] ;
where L(z) is dened in (20). By integration by parts and using L(y1+ y2) = 1, we can
simplify this to
E [ (y1; y2; A)] = Ey1;y2 [ (y1; y2; y1 + y2)] 
n  2
n  1Ey1;y2 [
Z y1+y2
y1+y2 
@
@z
 (y1; y2; z)L(z)dz] :
Now let us derive the rst-order approximation of (). (For our purpose, we do
not need the higher-order approximations.) According to the formula above, we have
() = E [f(y1   )(1  F (y2 + ))] + n  2
n  1E['()] ; (44)
where
'() =
Z y1+y2
y1+y2 
f(y1   )f(z   y1 + )L(z)dz ;
and the expectations are taken over y1 and y2.
3When the support of xi is nite and f(x) > 0, the density of xi   yi has a kink at zero such
that h0(0) is not well dened. However, one can check that limt!0  h0(t) =
R
f 0(x)dF (x)n 1 and
limt!0+ h0(t) =
R
f 0(x)dF (x)n 1   (n  1)f(x)2. We use h0(0 ) in our approximations.
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When   0, we have f(y1   )  f(y1)  f 0(y1), so
E [f(y1   )] 
Z
f(y1)dF (y1)
n 1   
Z
f 0(y1)dF (y1)n 1 = h(0)  h0(0) :
We also have 1  F (y2 + )  1  F (y2)  f(y2), so
E [(1  F (y2 + ))] 
Z
(1  F (y2))dF (y2)n 1   
Z
f(y2)dF (y2)
n 1 =
1
n
  h(0) :
To approximate E['()], notice that '(0) = 0 and '0(0) = f(y1)f(y2) since L(z) is
independent of  and L(y1 + y2) = 1. Hence,
E['()]  E[f(y1)f(y2)] = h(0)2 :
Substituting these approximations into (44) and discarding all higher order terms yields
the approximation for () in (43). The other approximations can be derived similarly.
Step 2: When n is large, the system of (24) and (25) has a solution with a small .
Lemma 10 Suppose jf
0(x)j
f(x)
is bounded and limn!1 p = 0, where p = 1nh(0) is the separate
sales price in (1). Then when n is su¢ ciently large, the system of (24) and (25) has a
solution with  2 (0; 1
nh(0)
).
Proof. Recall that (25) is
1=n+ (() + ())
() + () + 2()| {z }
()
(()  ()) = 
1()  () :
Denote the left-hand side by L() and the right-hand side by R(). Notice that the
assumption that jf
0(x)j
f(x)
is bounded implies that jh
0(0)j
h(0)
is uniformly bounded for any n.4
We rst show that L(0) < R(0). At  = 0, it is easy to verify that () =
1
n
h(0),
() =
 
1  1
n

h(0), () = 0 and 
1() = 1n
 
1  1
n

. Then (0) = 1
nh(0)
and
L() =
1
n
(1  2
n
) < R() =
1
n
(1  1
n
) :
Next, we show that L() > R() at  =
1
nh(0)
when n is su¢ ciently large. The
condition limn!1 p = 0 implies that  = 1nh(0)  0 when n is large. Replacing  in (43)
by 1
nh(0)
, we have
()  h(0)
n
 

h0(0)
n
+
h(0)2
n  1

1
nh(0)
=
h(0)
n
  h
0(0)
n2h(0)
  h(0)
n(n  1) :
4Suppose jf
0(x)j
f(x) < M for a constant M < 1. Then  Mf(x) < f 0(x) < Mf(x), and so
 M R f(x)dF (x)n 1 < R f 0(x)dF (x)n 1 < M R f(x)dF (x)n 1 for any n. That is,  Mh(0) < h0(0) <
Mh(0) for any n, and so jh
0(0)j
h(0) is uniformly bounded.
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Similarly,
() 

1  1
n

h(0) +

h0(0)
n
  h(0)2

1
nh(0)
=

1  2
n

h(0) +
h0(0)
n2h(0)
;
()  nh(0)
2
n  1
1
nh(0)
=
h(0)
n  1 ;
and

1()  1
n

1  1
n

  2h(0)
n
1
nh(0)
=
1
n
  3
n2
:
(Notice that in each expression we just replaced  by 1
nh(0)
and no further approximations
have been made.)
Notice that L() > R() if and only if
1
n
+ (() + ())

[()  ()] > [
1()  ()] [() + () + 2()] : (45)
Using the above approximations, we have
()+()  2h(0)
n
  h
0(0)
n2h(0)
and () () 

1  3
n

h(0)+
2h0(0)
n2h(0)
+
h(0)
n(n  1) :
Then the left-hand side of (45) equals
1
n
+
1
nh(0)

2h(0)
n
  h
0(0)
n2h(0)



1  3
n

h(0) +
2h0(0)
n2h(0)
+
h(0)
n(n  1)

=

1
n
+
2
n2
  1
n3
h0(0)
h(0)2



h(0)  3
n
h(0) +
2h0(0)
n2h(0)
+
h(0)
n(n  1)



1
n
  1
n2

h(0) :
(The nal step is from discarding all higher order terms. This is valid given limn!1 1nh(0) =
0 and jh
0(0)j
h(0)
is uniformly bounded for any n.)
Using the approximations, we also have

1()  ()  1
n
  4
n2
+
1
n2(n  1) +
h0(0)
n3h(0)2
;
and
() + () + 2()  h(0)
n
  h
0(0)
n2h(0)
  h(0)
n(n  1) +

1  2
n

h(0) +
h0(0)
n2h(0)
+
2h(0)
n  1
=

1  1
n

h(0) +
h(0)
n  1

2  1
n

=
nh(0)
n  1
Then the right-hand side of (45) equals
1
n
  4
n2
+
1
n2(n  1) +
h0(0)
n3h(0)2

 nh(0)
n  1 

1
n
  3
n(n  1)

h(0) :
9
(The nal step is again from discarding all higher order terms.) Then it is ready to see
that L() > R() at  =
1
nh(0)
when n is su¢ ciently large. This completes the proof
of the lemma.
Step 3: Approximate the solution to the system of (24) and (25) when n is large.
Given the system has a solution with a small  when n is large, we can approximate
each side of (25) around   0 by using (43) and discarding all higher order terms.
Then one can solve
  1
nh(0)
1 + h(0)
1 + n
n 1h(0)
;   1
2h0(0)
h(0)
+ 2n
2 3n+2
n2 n nh(0)
:
It is clear that  < p = 1
nh(0)
. Since n is large and jh
0(0)j
h(0)
is uniformly bounded for any
n, this can be further approximated as
  1
nh(0)
;   1
2nh(0)
:
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